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Rapport in het kort 
 
Duurzame kwaliteit van leven  
Conceptuele analyse voor empirisch onderzoek 
 
Bij duurzame ontwikkeling gaat het om het nastreven van een duurzame kwaliteit van leven. 
Een duurzame kwaliteit van leven in een natiestaat is een kwaliteit van leven van de 
bevolking binnen de landsgrenzen, waarvan het niveau voor de huidige generatie  
(1) continueerbaar is gegeven de natuurlijke en sociale hulpbronnen waarover de natie 
beschikt en (2) die niet ten koste gaat van een aanvaardbare kwaliteit van leven voor (2a) de 
inwoners van andere naties in de huidige generatie alsmede (2b) de volgende generaties in de 
eigen natie en (2c) daarbuiten. In dit rapport wordt uitgewerkt hoe kwaliteit van leven 
conceptueel en empirisch benaderd kan worden. Van drie benaderingen van kwaliteit van 
leven, te weten de hulpbronnenbenadering, de geluksbenadering en de capability-benadering 
wordt de laatste het meest geschikt bevonden voor nadere uitwerking. 
Bij de capability-benadering gaat het om de reële mogelijkheden voor mensen om op diverse 
terreinen van het sociale leven te functioneren, en wel in overeenstemming met hun eigen 
wensen en zelfbeeld. Het rapport stelt dat het mogelijk is om Nederlanders enerzijds te 
bevragen over het belang dat zij hechten aan verschillende domeinen van 
functioneringsmogelijkheden en ze anderzijds te bevragen over zowel (a) hun normatieve 
opvattingen over wat de internationale en intergenerationele rechtvaardigheid vereist als  
(b) hun empirische opvattingen over de beperkingen die dergelijke vereisten aan de 
Nederlandse samenleving zouden opleggen. Vervolgens volgt een aanzet voor een capability-
index voor de kwaliteit van leven. 
 
Trefwoorden: 
kwaliteit van leven, duurzaamheid, capabilities  
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Preface 
 
In the Sustainability Outlooks that were published by the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency (Milieu- en Natuurplanbureau, MNP) in 2004 and 2007, sustainability is 
(roughly) defined as the ‘availability and continuability of a certain quality of life’. Since the 
first Sustainability Outlook lacked a precise and conceptual analysis of ‘quality of life’ (or 
human well-being) and its relationship with ‘sustainability’, the MNP commissioned  
Dr. Ingrid Robeyns and Dr. Robert van der Veen of the University of Amsterdam to describe 
and evaluate the various conceptualisations of ‘quality of life’ available in the scientific 
literature and to make a proposal for a method to quantitatively measure quality of life. The 
capability approach – one of the more promising conceptual approaches – has been explored 
by the authors in some depth in this report, after consultation with the MNP steering 
committee for this study. This committee consisted of Theo Aalbers (chair), Johan Melse, 
Bert de Vries and Arthur Petersen. The present report is an abbreviated and translated version 
of the original Dutch report ‘Duurzame kwaliteit van leven: Conceptuele analyse voor 
empirisch onderzoek’ (MNP Report 550031005/2007). 
The responsibility for this report’s content lies exclusively with the authors; it does not 
necessarily contain the views of the MNP on this subject matter. Our expectation is that this 
report will provide thinkers on sustainability and quality of life with a good deal of 
interesting information. 
 
Arthur Petersen 
Programme Manager, Methodology and Modelling Programme 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
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Summary 
 
 
How can a ‘sustainable quality of life’ be approached conceptually and empirically? This is 
the main question of this report. There is no generally accepted definition of ‘quality of life’. 
In this study, after it has been made clear what the word ‘sustainable’ in ‘sustainable quality 
of life’ precisely means, three theoretical approaches are compared that argue for a distinct 
interpretation of the substantive content of life quality. The first of these approaches is the 
liberal resource approach: people need access to certain resources, in order to become 
capable of developing and pursuing their own conceptions of the good life, by deploying their 
resource shares autonomously within the boundaries of equitable social institutions. In 
opposition to this view, the utilitarian tradition identifies quality of life (or in effect 
synonymously: well-being) with a metric of subjective utility – which is often measured as 
happiness or alternatively life satisfaction. The third approach understands life quality as a set 
of capabilities, that is to say of real possibilities for people to function effectively in diverse 
domains of social life, in accordance with their own views of the valuable life in terms of 
one’s ‘doing and being’. According to the capability approach, the government is tasked to 
make available the resources which are necessary for the capabilities of individuals. This 
concerns both individual and collective resources. The third approach is further developed in 
this report. 
In the first Sustainability Outlook of the MNP (2004), the notions of ‘sustainability’ and 
‘quality of life’ were intertwined in an uncommon operationalisation, which made use of a 
survey instrument with questions about the importance that people attach to the solution of a 
large number of societal problems. The present report argues that the first Sustainability 
Outlook implemented the notion of ‘sustainability in life quality’, and it gives reasons why 
instead the notion of ‘sustainability of life quality’ should have been followed. 
Sustainable quality of life is defined as: Sustainable quality of life in a national setting is the 
quality of life enjoyed by the population within the national territory, the level of which is (1) 
viably reproducible for the current generation, given the natural and social resources 
commanded by the nation, and (2) is gained neither at the expense of an acceptable quality of 
life for (2a) members of the present generation outside the nation, nor of that of (2b) 
members of the next generations at home and (2c) the next generations elsewhere. This 
definition of sustainable quality of life needs to be specified in many ways. Normatively, 
because the constraints must be derived from principles of intergenerational and international 
justice which the government must accept as binding. Conceptually, because the content of 
the constraints under whatever such principles will also depend on what we mean by ‘quality 
of life’. Empirically, because the demands posed by accepted normative principles regarding 
the distribution of life quality potentials across space and time need to be translated into 
specific constraints on the use of resources by the present generation at home. And finally, 
whether any given set of constraints thus specified will in fact be accepted as binding also 
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depends on the extent to which other nations observe similar constraints. This raises familiar 
issues of international collective action and policy coordination.  
The authors conclude that on theoretical grounds the capability approach is to be preferred as 
the foundation for a measure of the quality of life. According to the report, it is possible to 
survey the Dutch population with respect to, on the one hand, the importance they attach to 
different domains of functionings and, on the other hand, both (a) their normative opinions on 
what is demanded by international and intergenerational justice and (b) their empirical 
opinions on the constraints for Dutch society that should follow from these requirements of 
justice.  
Initial ideas are developed for a capability index that measures quality of life. However, it 
must be kept firmly in mind that the empirical development of the capability approach is still 
in an early stage. It is possible that further research will reveal disadvantages of a capability-
based life quality-index that are insufficiently appreciated at present. The present study aims 
to provide only the foundations for the full construction of a ‘capability-index’. Finally, the 
report offers suggestions for further empirical work by MNP. 
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1 Disentangling the concepts 
 
1.1 General introduction 
 
Quality of life is a familiar concept which appears in a multitude of contexts. But it has no 
single accepted definition. In fact many different meanings adhere to ‘quality of life’ in 
several social domains, in politics, as well as in applications in policy and science. Now for 
most similar large concepts, such as freedom, justice, efficiency and welfare, social and 
political philosophy provides guidance in sorting out the analytical structure of technical and 
everyday meanings. But strangely enough, ‘quality of life’ rarely figures as a central concept 
in social and political philosophy. For example, it has no lemmas in two well-known 
philosophical encyclopedias - the ‘Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy’, and the ‘Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy’. However, as Griffin (1998) correctly observes, well-being and 
quality of life are frequently treated as synonyms in philosophical discourse. And therefore 
the question of meaning concerns not so much the exact differences in usage between these 
two terms but rather the different ways in which one may specify their substantive content. 
What quality of life is, however, is not merely a philosophical issue. The practical 
implications of different theories on what constitutes quality of life lead to diverging 
recommendations on what, if anything, government should undertake to promote it, and also 
give rise to distinct ideas concerning the design of social and economic institutions. Thus in 
general, the public choice of a particular conception of life quality has far-reaching 
consequences, in the same way as with the other large concepts – e.g. freedom, justice or 
equality – mentioned above. Moreover, just like those other concepts, what we mean by 
quality of life is highly sensitive to the specific context and the areas of social life within 
which that question is asked. One particular context of importance here is given by the issue 
of upholding a certain level of life quality in a society consistently with normative concerns 
of sustainability. 
In this study we sketch the theoretical underpinnings for the task of developing an index of 
life quality that takes account of sustainability, can serve as the basis of an empirical 
operationalization, is relevant for government policy, and is sufficiently accessible to play a 
role in public debate. The plan is as follows. In this chapter we address the difficult 
relationship between life quality and sustainability. Section 1.2 first provides a general 
understanding of the different criteria of distributive justice which the idea of ‘sustainability’ 
entails for a national society such as the Netherlands, in which the primary goal of 
sustainability is to provide the conditions for a viable level of life quality for the present 
generation at home, under moral constraints of respecting the options for achieving an 
acceptable quality of life elsewhere in space and later in time. Then in section 1.3 we briefly 
discuss some of the issues that are raised by the need for working out the concepts of life 
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quality and sustainability in ways that are ‘relevant to government policy’. The main item of 
the chapter follows in section 1.4, where we argue the position that criteria of sustainability 
should not as such enter into the concept of life quality. Rather, these criteria provide the 
normative restrictions that would have to constrain the pursuit of life quality for Dutch 
citizens, in order to safeguard the continuity of life quality within the present generation at 
home, and in order to ensure compliance with widely shared principles of international and 
intergenerational justice. 
Whereas in Chapter 1 we examine elements of the sustainability concept independently of the 
possible interpretations of the ‘quality of life’, Chapter 2 is concerned to present and compare 
three theoretical approaches that argue for a distinct interpretation of the substantive content 
of life quality. This is in fact the main task of the present report. To give a brief overview, the 
first of these approaches is the liberal resource approach: people need access to certain 
resources, in order to become capable of developing and pursuing their own conceptions of 
the good life, by deploying their resource shares autonomously within the boundaries of 
equitable social institutions. This approach holds that government should create fair 
conditions for individuals to command strategic resources - such as income, free time, 
education and public infrastructure - which are required for realizing a multiplicity of goals in 
life, ranging for example all the way from hedonistic consumption, entrepreneurship, 
immersion in art or science, to religious ascetism. With respect to the value of such diverse 
conceptions of the good the resource approach maintains a strictly agnostic position. The 
general rule is that government should observe neutrality in this area, and should therefore 
not attempt to promote socially authoritative formulations on what it is, exactly, that makes a 
life worth living, over and above conditions of access to general all-purpose means. Thus the 
distinct view of the resource approach consists in taking the effective availability of a set of 
strategic resources as neutral proxies for the comparison and measurement of people’s life 
qualities. 
In opposition to this view, the utilitarian tradition identifies quality of life (or in effect 
synonymously: well-being) with a metric of subjective utility – which is often measured as 
happiness or alternatively life satisfaction. Central to this tradition, at least in the classical 
formulation, is the assertion that subjective well-being is comparable across individuals and 
cultures, and capable of scientific measurement. On that basis, utilitarianism has its own 
interpretation of a liberal role for government. A neutral and equitable treatment requires that 
each person’s utility is given equal weight in the social calculus underlying policy and 
legislation. In the classical formulation, the familiar maximizing rule for average utility is 
then derived as government’s central guideline in the allocation and distribution of various 
resources. Such resources, then, do not enter into the definition of life quality as proxies, as in 
the resource approach, but appear instead as instrumental ‘correlates of happiness’. In the last 
decades, this essentially subjective approach to life quality has undergone a marked revival, 
especially among economists and in psychological research. 
The third and last approach we discuss is situated halfway between the resource and 
subjective approaches. Yet it is not merely a compromise view, having its own roots in 
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philosophical tradition, and offering its own version on the liberal role of government. This is 
the approach, pioneered by Amartya Sen, which understands life quality as a set of 
capabilities, that is to say of real possibilities for people to function effectively in diverse 
domains of social life, in accordance with their own views of the valuable life in terms of 
one’s ‘doing and being’. The capability approach agrees with the subjective one that 
resources are the instrumental conditions of life quality, but just as the resource approach in 
political theory, it uses a broad notion of the all-purpose means that figure as inputs required 
for realizing life quality, conceived as a set of capabilities. Central to this approach is the 
question of how to identify the relevant domains in which effective functioning constitutes a 
person’s quality of life. It is only on the basis of distinct answers to this question that one can 
specify the set of ‘real possibilities of functioning’ which define the capability approach to 
life quality. Different views are possible here. According to Martha Nussbaum, philosophical 
reflection inspired by the Aristotelian tradition can deliver an interculturally invariant list of 
essential functionings. In Sen’s original formulation, however, such a list can not be obtained 
from philosophical reasoning as such, but in the end needs to be derived from a democratic 
process of deliberation. 
We are more attracted to this last view for reasons that will be argued below in Chapter 2. On 
the basis of Sen’s ‘democratic’ conception of the list, one can see clearly how the capability 
approach is situated with respect to the other two approaches. On the one hand, it extends 
beyond the resource approach, which denies the political legitimacy of formulating an 
intersubjectively valid conception of life quality. On the other hand, the capability approach 
locates that conception downstream of the utility metric, as it were. Although having the 
capabilities to function will usually cause subjective well-being, this well-being is seen as an 
evidently desirable by-product of life quality, not as its substance. In the capability approach, 
then, enjoying a high quality of life is constituted by the ample availability of options to 
function properly in accordance with one’s own choices and sense of identity. The fact that 
this may often produce a high score on a scale of happiness, life-satisfaction, or some other 
measure of subjective utility, is taken as a consequence of life quality rather than as 
constitutive evidence. 
Needless to say each of these three approaches has its own problems. We discuss them 
separately, presenting the relevant findings of debates within economics and political 
philosophy. In section 4 of chapter 2, we then summarize and conclude tentatively in favour 
of using the capability approach as the starting point for developing an index of life quality 
for purposes of policy in the Netherlands, which is informed by the resource approach in that 
it seeks to link functionings and capabilities to specific resources, and which operates on the 
expectation that measures developed by the subjective approach serve - at least in part – to 
validate such an index. 
Next in the first two sections of Chapter 3, we present a detailed sketch of the research 
programme for working out a capability-index of life quality. That index contains indicators 
of relevant options of functioning for individuals in different ‘strategic’ domains of social 
life. For each of these domains, the indicators should reflect essential aspects of a person’s 
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quality of life. This does not imply however, that life quality is measured exhaustively by 
such an index. The purpose of the index is to summarize those aspects of life quality which 
are relevant for government policy, and which can be connected with constraints of 
sustainability. Each domain in our tentative list must thus contain empirically tractable 
indicators of functioning options, which are in turn tied to several types of resource inputs. In 
this operationalization of life quality, it should be possible - at least in principle - to estimate 
the resource cost of different levels of capabilities and judge the extent to which such levels 
are compatible with key sustainability constraints. However, as we will discuss in Chapter 4, 
large difficulties stand in the way of linking life quality to sustainability via resource 
requirements, and we shall therefore concentrate on working out the first stages of index 
measurement in this report. 
The notion of a index that could serve as a single summary measure of the quality of life for 
individuals and groups obviously involves the problem of aggregating the capability-
indicators within a domain, and across the different domains on our list, by giving indicators 
and domains certain weights in the index We discuss this problem in the last section of 
Chapter 3. Different types of weights can be distinguished. For example, a set of ‘democratic 
weights’ would reflect the importance that people living in a country attach to the various 
dimensions of life quality on average, whereas a set of ‘sustainability weights’ would rank 
domains of life quality in terms of a relevant estimate of resource cost. We argue that specific 
procedures of aggregation should always be assessed against a benchmark set of equal 
weights, and describe some of the requirements that such a benchmark should satisfy. 
The three sections of Chapter 3 aim to provide a research framework for a capability-based 
index of life quality, as described above. It offers no more than this, however, because 
actually doing the work of operationalizing the indicators in different domains, and indeed of 
selecting domains across the whole field of social life, involves research clearly beyond the 
scope of this report. The report is rather meant to chart the different conceptual steps and 
empirical procedures which may enable the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
(MNP) to judge the merits of undertaking such research, in the context of its broader interest 
in clarifying the relationships between life quality and sustainability. 
As we mentioned above, sorting out those relationships is complicated, both conceptually and 
empirically, and it raises fundamental issues of policy design as well. The longer Dutch-
language version of this report contains two separate chapters on these topics which are 
summarized in Chapter 4, responding to the research program of the MNP Sustainability 
Outlook.1 
 
                                                 
1 In this report, we will most often refer to the English summary of the Sustainability Outlook (MNP-RIVM, 2005). The original 
Dutch report is included in our list of references as MNP-RIVM, 2004.  
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1.2 Sustainability: global and national 
 
At the outset it is important to reflect on the obvious point that quality of life – however one 
conceives of it - and ‘sustainability’ do not necessarily coincide. The two may not even be 
positively related. A population can enjoy a high quality of life at the expense of future 
generations, by depleting natural resources, or irreversibly polluting the environment. Strong 
population changes may also harm the prospects of future generations for sustaining a given 
level of life quality. Moreover, even within the more limited timescale of the present 
generation, the global distribution of resources and the way in which many of these resources 
are used, for example in energy consumption, will be likely to create highly unequal 
opportunities for attaining quality of life across nations. Before asking just how life quality is 
related to concerns of sustainability in section 1.4, we want to focus on the key conceptual 
features of ‘sustainability’ in a national context. 
As the well-known definition of the Brundtlandt Commission in the report Our Common 
Future shows, the notion of sustainability was conceived originally at the global level, in 
terms of a concern for ‘future generations’, taken as a single entity. Sustainability then refers 
to the requirement that current economic processes should “ensure the needs of the present 
without compromising the needs of future generations to meet their own needs”. Robert 
Solow specified this requirement by stating that the next generation should have “whatever it 
takes to achieve a standard of living at least as good as our own and to look after their next 
generation similarly” (cited in Sen, 2004a: 2). These global formulations share two 
presuppositions with respect to their object of concern and their attribution of responsibility. 
To start with the first of these, rather than referring to quality of life, both formulations place 
a generational constraint on the capacity to satisfy needs, or more specifically, to achieve a 
‘standard of living’. As we will see in Chapter 2, the standard of living should be 
distinguished from the quality of life. Whereas the former usually refers to command over 
economic resources, the latter almost invariably has a broader connotation. Even if quality of 
life is ultimately defined in a resource-oriented way, it will take into account non-economic 
resources, such as civil rights, which are deemed essential to human well-being. Moreover, 
while living standard usually refers to aggregate resource opportunities of economies as a 
whole, life quality – at least in the sense in which we are using the term here – is defined at 
the individual level. 
Secondly, the normative requirement to take future generations into account takes the form of 
a moral duty of the global community as a whole to take care of the needs of future 
generations as a matter of justice, or, again more specifically, a duty not to ‘compromise’ the 
options of the next generation for achieving a standard of living as least as good as the 
current generation enjoys. However, this leaves unanswered the large question how this 
general duty of care should be translated into responsibilities of global agents - that is to say 
national states and international agencies of various kinds - for meeting standards of 
intergenerational distribution. Moreover, in Solow’s more specific statement at least, there is 
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the large question as to why the living standard to be achieved by the ‘next generation’ 
should at least equal the one enjoyed by the ‘current generation’, given the extreme 
inequalities in living standards existing around the world at present. For example, global 
income inequality between individuals, as measured by the Gini coefficient, surpasses the 
degree of inequality in all countries save Namibia (UNDP, 2005: 37-8) 
In the general context of raising awareness about sustainability problems, it is perhaps 
understandable that these normative issues are left open. But they need to be faced as soon as 
the concept of sustainability is applied to a single nation such as the Netherlands. In that case, 
sustainability includes both intergenerational and international standards of distributive 
justice, to which the national government should in principle be responsive. To sum up, for 
our purposes we have to replace ‘standard of living’ by ‘quality of life’ as the relevant object 
of concern for sustainability, and we have to include the international dimension along with 
the intergenerational dimension among the normative requirements of sustainability that may 
bear upon national and international policies of the Netherlands. In general, this gives the 
following definition of sustainable quality of life in a nation state: 
 
Sustainable quality of life in a national setting is the quality of life enjoyed by the 
population within the national territory, the level of which is (1) viably reproducible for the 
current generation, given the natural and social resources commanded by the nation, and 
(2) is gained neither at the expense of an acceptable quality of life for (2a) members of the 
present generation outside the nation, nor of that of (2b) members of the next generations 
at home and (2c) the next generations elsewhere. 
 
Some comments on this definition are in order. First, a national government is bound to be 
concerned to carry out policies which contribute to a viable level of the quality of life ‘at 
home’ and ‘at present’, within limits of available resources and under constraints pertaining 
to the interests of persons both ‘later’ and ‘elsewhere’. Part (1) of the definition puts this 
primary concern at the forefront. Sustainability ‘at home and at present’ then refers to the 
overarching policy goal of promoting an acceptable degree of life quality for the population 
living within the national territory, which can be maintained over the period, say 25 years, in 
which newborn children grow up to adulthood. This policy goal aims to rule out short-run 
attempts to increase life quality beyond the economic and ecological resource base of the 
nation, and the goal would for example preclude overexploitation of local gas and oil 
reserves, as well as neglecting public sector in health, education and spatial infrastructure in 
favour of boosting private consumption.  
These very commonplace points need to be stated carefully at the outset, in order to avoid the 
impression that issues of sustainability reduce to safeguarding the interests of persons living 
‘later’ and/or ‘elsewhere’. Citizens and politicians who strive to prevent unsustainable 
policies or wasteful patterns of production and consumption in the Netherlands are by no 
means exclusively interested in promoting the life quality of individuals outside the national 
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borders, or of future generations even in their own nation. Far more frequently, they are 
concerned to create conditions for keeping the national household in order in the ‘here and 
now’. This is not merely a question of myopia or group egoism. Nor is it merely explained by 
the fact that the interests of people later and elsewhere are often hard to ascertain. It rather 
has to do with the judgement that other nations, and collectivities belonging to future 
generations, must assume their own responsibilities for taking care of their own households. 
When speaking of ‘sustainability’ in a national context, this very basic tendency has to be 
kept in mind. If it is ignored, ‘sustainability’ runs the risk of becoming a morally 
overextended concept which unnecessarily carries a connotation of exclusive altruistic 
concern for the ‘later and elsewhere’, and is likely to produce adverse political responses. 
Secondly however, this is not to say that the goal of maintaining a (possibly high) level of life 
quality for the current generation at home is to enjoy absolute priority. It is only to say that 
the demands of intergenerational and international justice which enter our definition of 
sustainability should be conceived as constraints upon the pursuit of this goal. Table 1.1 
presents the structure of the definition in a two-by-two array. It shows that there are three 
types of moral constraints, which respectively refer to the interests of members of the current 
generation living outside the Netherlands (2a), prospective members of the next generation 
inside the Netherlands (2b) and prospective members of the next generation living abroad 
(2c). 
 
Table 1.1 Sustainable quality of life in a national setting 
‘At home’   ‘Elsewhere’ 
  
 Present generation 
 
 
Future generations 
 
 
Thirdly, the nature of the difference between the goal of sustainability in cell (1) of the table 
and the three constraints in cells (2a) to 2(c) needs to be clarified. So far nothing specific has 
been said about the content of these constraints, but in general it can be said that the national 
government cannot take a direct responsibility for ensuring an acceptable quality of life for 
persons elsewhere and/or later. Thus the constraints of these three cells need to be understood 
as duties of forbearance. In the pursuit of its goal to ensure an acceptable quality of life for 
the present generation at home under these three constraints, the national government is 
bound by the duty to refrain from actions that would prevent other nations in the current 
(1) Objective: Acceptable and viable 
quality of life 
(2a) Constraints: 
Acceptable quality of life 
(2b) Constraints: 
Acceptable quality of life 
(2c) Constraints: 
Acceptable quality of life 
page 18 of 99 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) 
 
generation from pursuing a similar goal, and likewise for the next generations both at home 
and abroad. 
For the next generations at home (2b) this seems clear enough from Solow’s formulation that 
each future generation should have to have ‘whatever it takes to achieve a standard of living 
at least as good as our own’. For this condition obviously does not entail the duty to ensure 
that future generations at home would actually enjoy a viably reproducible level of life 
quality comparable to the current level, when the time comes. Whether they do or not will 
obviously depend on their own individual and collective decisions. The government’s duty 
only extends to ensuring that future generations will be capable of reaching that comparable 
level, in so far as this can be shown to depend upon its actions ‘here and now’. In principle 
the same applies to the duties of forbearance which are addressed to safeguarding the 
resource potential for reaching an ‘acceptable’ quality of life within other nations, either 
currently (2a) or in the future (2c). In these cases, however, it is much less clear how to 
specify these resource potentials, since this will depend on the standards of international 
distributive justice which command agreement. 
To sum up, the definition of sustainability offered above is tailored to national 
responsibilities, but needs to be specified in many ways. Normatively, because the constraints 
must be derived from principles of intergenerational and international justice which the 
government must accept as binding. Conceptually, because the content of the constraints 
under whatever such principles will also depend on what we mean by ‘quality of life’. 
Empirically, because the demands posed by accepted normative principles regarding the 
distribution of life quality potentials across space and time need to be translated into specific 
constraints on the use of resources by the present generation at home. And finally, whether 
any given set of constraints thus specified will in fact be accepted as binding also depends on 
the extent to which other nations observe similar constraints. This raises familiar issues of 
international collective action and policy coordination. 
All this shows that it is difficult indeed to arrive at a clear picture of what the concrete 
policies of sustainability should be, under this general definition. Even assuming a worldwide 
consensus about normative principles, and even if such consensus were to be implemented in 
a definite allocation of responsibility across nations and international agencies, it will still 
remain highly uncertain what exactly is required in the way of resource constraints under the 
broad heading of ‘sustainability’. This is so because even under the most ideal assumptions, 
those requirements inevitably depend on likely technological changes, future reserves of 
natural resources, projections of the state of the global environment, and estimates of political 
stability in the world, for example of internal conflicts such as civil wars. Thus much of the 
massively detailed knowledge needed for specifying what sustainability would actually 
require from politics in any given nation is clearly unavailable, and the available knowledge 
is moreover bound to be contested. We will return to this point in Chapter 4. 
Just how far removed we are at present from a normative consensus about the principles of 
sustainability is also shown by two points of contention concerning the substance of 
intergenerational and international justice. One may ask to what extent sustainable policies in 
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the present impose equal responsibilities towards all future generations, or instead a 
discounted responsibility for the potential well-being of generations further down in time, on 
the assumption that the intervening generations must take their own share of responsibility. 
One can interpret Solow’s formulation of sustainability in this last way, for he stipulates that 
each generation should ‘similarly take care of their next generation’ in providing whatever it 
takes to uphold a standard of living at least as good as its own. But this does not tell us much 
about the size of the discount factor, nor does it take account of the fact that the present 
generation may well succeed in preserving good conditions for the next one, while adversely 
affecting the conditions for the generations that will be in existence after that time. 
In the international setting, a fundamental problem of sustainability is the difficulty of 
specifying the baseline for assessing whether a national policy is ‘harming’ the resource 
potential of other nations to achieve an acceptable level of life quality. In one interpretation, 
the existing global distribution of resources is taken as the baseline. Sustainability then only 
requires that national policies of upholding a viable level of life quality at home do not 
foreseeably diminish the resources available elsewhere, under the status quo. In a more 
radical interpretation, the relevant baseline could be a far more egalitarian global distribution 
of the resource potential for life quality. In that case, sustainability may first require a 
positive contribution to international redistribution, before the commitment of not harming 
other nations comes into question.2  
In the next sections, however, we have to leave these theoretical issues open, as their 
discussion is far beyond the scope of this report. We proceed from the general definition of 
sustainability, in an attempt to clarify the notion of a ‘sustainable quality of life’ in a form 
that is pertinent to governmental policy. 
1.3 Policy relevance, political legitimacy and comparability 
 
In the general introduction we mentioned the need for understanding life quality and 
sustainability in a way that has relevance to the context of governmental policy. We first 
make some observations about sustainability. As will be clear from the previous section, the 
relevance of this concept is bound to be increased for the advisory purposes of the MNP, by 
distinguishing among the various requirements implied by narrowing down the originally 
global connotation of a sustainable world society to the connotation of a sustainable national 
society which is morally tied to the rest of the world. Our understanding of sustainability is in 
line with the Sustainability Outlook, which holds that that a national society such as the 
                                                 
2 To bring this radical interpretation under sustainability constraint (2a), it might be held that rich nations who refuse to contribute to 
achieving the more egalitarian baseline when it is within their power to do so are thereby in fact harming poor nations, even if they 
do not inflict harm on these poor nations as judged from the status quo. Pogge’s theory on the negative duties of justice of rich 
nations is based on this view (Pogge, 2002, Ch 4).  
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Netherlands should be committed to upholding life quality ‘here and now, as well as 
elsewhere and later’ (MNP-RIVM, 2005: 6).  
The definition we have discussed can be helpful here in several ways. First, for drawing up a 
systematic inventory of the requirements of sustainability that actually are in force within 
Dutch policies. Cell (1) of Table 1.1. directs attention to policies in the areas where the 
primary goal is the continuity of life quality in the Netherlands within the next two or three 
decades. For example, the Fourth Environmental Policy Plan of the Dutch Government is an 
obvious source here. Some policies belonging to Cells (2a) to (2c) can be listed by studying 
the implementation of Dutch responsibilities under international treaties, or under the 
Millennium Development Goals. As far as we know, this kind of inventory research has not 
yet been undertaken. It would be highly useful, especially in case the MNP is expected to 
provide systematic assessments of the resource consequences of actual commitments to 
promote sustainability. We return to this point below and finally in Chapter 4. 
In this report we mainly focus on the policy relevance of working out a concrete measure of 
life quality for the Netherlands. In general, this involves considerations of conceptual 
transparency, empirical specification and sensitivity to various policy instruments. But the 
policy relevance of an ‘index of life quality’ also necessitates paying attention to 
requirements of political legitimacy and simplicity, as will be explained below. With respect 
to conceptual transparency, we argue in Chapter 2 that a relevant index of the quality of life 
should be based on clear theoretical foundations. This is why we think that the three 
approaches discussed in the general introduction - the resource-based, utility-based, and 
capability-based notions of life quality – should first be examined closely in terms of their 
empirical operationalizations and practical implications in order to make a reasoned choice 
among these approaches, on which quality indicators can be based that are capable of being 
affected by existing or new instruments of policy. Of course it will sometimes be the case that 
such indicators are affected more strongly by autonomous developments in society, or by 
transnational processes which are beyond the government’s control. However, the relevance 
of the chosen concept of life quality also partly consists in the possibilities of critically 
evaluating tendencies in policy programs. For example, new utilitarians argue that the 
frequent attempts to raise average working time in order to boost per capita income may be 
counterproductive, because above certain income thresholds, overall life satisfaction is served 
more efficiently by increasing free time (Layard, 2005, Ch. 4). As we will show later, free 
time is also important within the resource and capability approaches. Thus even though 
considerations of life quality may not be decisive for judging the merits of labour augmenting 
policies in the end, those policies will at least be evaluated differently on the basis of a clearly 
stated measure of that concept. 
With respect to the background aspect of political legitimacy, it is important to note that even 
if it is possible to arrive at a theoretically sound set of indicators for measuring the overall 
quality of life in a society, some care should be taken to demarcate quality dimensions that 
fall within the scope of legitimate policy intervention from those that lie clearly outside it. 
For example, intimate private decisions such as the choice of a life partner, or decisions 
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following one’s sexual proclivities, will undoubtedly affect an individual’s quality of life 
over time very strongly, but it is probably wise not to include these aspects in a policy-
relevant measure, because they are not directly within the scope of legitimate social control. 
Governments should indirectly provide for freedom of choice in these areas rather than 
regulating behaviour, even if such regulation might produce a better quality of life, however 
conceived. Of course it is to some extent a matter of judgment what types of intervention pass 
the test of legitimacy. To take another example, Layard (2005, Ch 9) cites evidence that 
regular meditation is highly conducive to life satisfaction. Yet it would arguably be unwise to 
monitor meditation practices among the population as a policy-relevant quality indicator, for 
it may well be one step too far to expect that governments would be authorized to step in and 
subsidize meditation courses, although it must be admitted that this is not inconceivable from 
a strictly utilitarian point of view. 
To round off, we mention a more practical requirement of relevance for government policy of 
an index of life quality, which is that it should be easy to explain how the country aggregate 
on such an index relates to GDP per capita. As we discuss in Chapter 2, GDP per capita is 
neither a good summary measure of life quality or well-being, nor was it originally intended 
as such. However, in practical policy terms, and in much of national politics almost 
everywhere in the world, GDP per capita is assumed to be the most important yardstick at 
least for comparing how well different societies are faring in their capacity to provide well-
being for their members on average. In order to be able to question this assumption 
effectively in policy discussions, an index of life quality must be capable of being ‘unpacked’ 
in order to show clearly where – and for what salient reasons – the two measures deviate. 
1.4 Sustainability and life quality: the nature of the 
relationship 
 
Much of the large literature on quality of life does not enter into concerns about 
sustainability. But as the title of this report testifies, here it is necessary to reflect carefully on 
various possibilities for interpreting the meaning of a ‘sustainable quality of life’. In this 
section we do so, by taking off from the definition of sustainability of section 1.2, but at a 
level of abstraction which still leaves open the choice between measures of life quality on the 
basis of the different approaches listed earlier. So before turning to Chapter 2 on this crucial 
issue, the question to be examined is: what exactly does it mean when we say, for example, 
that ‘a sustainable quality of life in the Netherlands is a viably reproducible average level of 
life quality for the present generation, given the national resource potential, and taking 
account of the moral constraints of respecting the potential for achieving an acceptable level 
of life quality for persons located elsewhere and/or at later points in time’? The most obvious 
way of reading this sentence is to take ‘sustainability’ as indicating that certain conditions 
must be placed on the pursuit of life quality for individuals in a national society, without 
thereby assuming that those conditions affect the substance of what life quality consists in. 
page 22 of 99 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) 
 
This is indeed the interpretation we favour. But it must be defended against an alternative 
interpretation, which plays a role in the research reported in the MNP’s Sustainability 
Outlook. In that alternative interpretation, the quality of life of individuals ‘here and now’ in 
part depends on the extent to which its currently realized level is viably reproducible for the 
present generation at home, and it also - and more importantly - depends on the extent to 
which the potentials for achieving an acceptable level of life quality elsewhere and/or later 
are in fact realized. This idea is based on the notion that levels of individual well-being are 
interdependent across space and time. To put it more specifically, the idea is that to the extent 
that members of Dutch society are aware that constraints of intergenerational and 
international justice are not being respected by the policies of their government, their own 
quality of life will be negatively affected. 
If this idea is true, then the constraints of sustainability entered into cells (2a) to (2c) of Table 
1.1 should be regarded as constitutive elements of life quality. But then the definition of 
sustainability, on which that Table is based, is logically inconsistent. For the definition takes 
a viably reproducible level of life quality as the objective to be pursued for the present 
generation at home, under certain constraints pertaining to the interests of people elsewhere 
and/or later in time. And this presupposes that the extent to which such constraints are known 
to be satisfied does not enter into the metric of life quality itself. Thus our definition 
implicitly takes for granted that the quality of life and the constraints under which it is being 
promoted are constitutively independent. If one is forced to admit, however, that life quality 
is inescapably interdependent across space and time in the way just described, then the 
definition needs to be reconsidered, and the notion of a ‘sustainable life quality’ in the title of 
this report also becomes misleading. We should then be talking about sustainability in life 
quality, as the authors of the Sustainability Outlook have in fact proposed in a 
methodological paper (MNP, 2006, section 6.4). Under this interdependent conception of the 
relationship between sustainability and life quality, the task of measuring the quality of life 
becomes far more complicated, because it becomes necessary to specify just in what ways 
quality levels are expected to vary with the availability of resource potentials for persons later 
and/or elsewhere, relative to given normative standards of just distribution. 
We want to argue in the present section that this alternative interpretation runs into severe 
problems. To introduce our discussion, a concrete example of the interdependent approach 
from the literature may be helpful, the ‘index of sustainable welfare’ (ISEW) varieties of 
which have been constructed by several economists. The method of building an ISEW takes a 
measure of personal consumption as the starting point, adds the imputed value of domestic 
work and ‘non-defensive’ public goods to this, and then proceeds to correct for the estimated 
‘welfare effects’ of several factors which are associated with the notion of sustainability: 
economic inequality, ‘defensive’ private consumption (such as installing burglary alarm 
systems in the house), the imputed cost of environmental pollution, and measures of 
depletion of ‘natural capital’ (Jackson et al., 1997: 5). Other variants of ISEW’s also include 
correction factors such as loss of welfare from crime, and additions to welfare from available 
free time. A recent example is the Measure of Domestic Progress, based on a decade of 
research by Tim Jackson’s team at the University of Surrey, commissioned by the New 
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Economics Foundation. This research shows that large discrepancies exist between changes 
in GNP per capita and such indexes of corrected growth. Jackson et al report that in the 
United Kingdom, average annual growth of GNP stood at 2 per cent, against only 0,5 per cent 
for this ISEW between 1950 and 1996. More spectacularly, while in the two decades between 
1976 and 1996, GNP per capita increased by 44%, the Measure of Domestic Progress 
decreased by 25% (Jackson et al., 1997: 28). ISEW’s have not so far been adopted for 
government policies. For this there may be good reasons. 
According to Eric Neumayer (1999), ISEW constructs are problematic in several respects. 
First of all, they lack a solid theoretical foundation. For one thing, it is unclear what exactly 
should be counted among the items of ‘defensive consumption’ – some regard health care 
expenses as such, and others do not. Neumayer also observes that it would be possible to 
factor dimensions such as the degree of political freedom or measures of gender inequality 
into the general rubric of ‘sustainability corrections’. These are not included in the indices 
above, but might well be. This suggests that the ISEW method is vulnerable to the charge of 
arbitrariness. Secondly, Neumayer shows that the numerical value of ISEW is highly 
sensitive to different monetary assessments of the ‘welfare effects’ that are said to be caused 
by economic inequality and environmental harm. The same would also hold, we think, for the 
incorporation of cost figures for natural resource depletion over time. Since there is little 
agreement on all such assessments, indices of sustainable welfare end up being inevitably 
controversial, to the point of becoming useless for purposes of government policy.  
More important for the purpose of our discussion perhaps is Neumayer’s third point of 
criticism. This is that lumping together in one index measure valuations of economic 
consumption and imputations derived from various sustainability concerns invites conceptual 
confusion. These two sets of concerns need to be distinguished, and they should therefore 
receive separate treatment in attempts at measurement (Neumayer, 1999: 91-96). Thus for 
example, introducing a negative correction factor into the index on income earned by persons 
in order to account for the welfare effect of currently existing income inequality in their 
society may ignore the possible contribution to aggregate wealth of the next generation, if it 
is the case that more savings are forthcoming from a higher degree of income inequality at 
present. Neumayer also correctly notes that including a correction measure of free time in the 
index represents a positive adjustment which should be added to available consumption 
goods, rather than being regarded as a correction for the supposed unsustainability of 
monetary economic welfare. Neumayer concludes that for all these reasons, welfare and 
sustainability should not be summarized into one aggregate index. 
We agree with Neumayer’s comments, and wish to add that his third point on the conceptual 
distinction between economic welfare and sustainability applies more generally to well-being, 
and thus to various conceptions of the ‘quality of life’. As we understand it, quality of life, 
irrespectively of how this concept is worked out in detail, is an inherently desirable state for 
individuals, whereas sustainability is concerned with securing a viable and fair distribution of 
this desirable state of affairs for individuals across time and space. This implies that life 
quality is constitutively independent from sustainability, and conceptually prior to it. Hence 
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the two concepts are not interdependent in the way described above. Only after it is specified 
what constitutes ‘quality of life’ can one begin to think about the relevant norms and 
empirical conditions that make up a conception of ‘sustainability’. It follows that 
‘sustainability’ must be understood as a shorthand expression for ‘sustainable quality of life’, 
rather than as an expression which incorporates demands of long term viability and fair 
distribution into the substance of life quality itself. We therefore think that the idea of 
sustainability in life quality should not be made part of the theoretical framework of 
sustainable development. 
To argue this position, we now advance three distinct but interrelated arguments. First of all it 
is a matter of sensible terminology not to lose connection with the originating notions of 
sustainability as advanced by the Brundtland Commision and Solow, for these notions serve 
as standards in general discourse, both public and scientific. Secondly, there is a fundamental 
philosophical point. It is possible to accommodate a certain kind of social interdependence 
between levels of individual well-being even without giving up on the idea that well-being is 
conceptually prior to sustainability. Thirdly, and as illustrated above in the discussion of the 
ISEW constructs, any attempt to incorporate demands of sustainability into an index of life 
quality is bound to produce a politically controversial index, in particular when those 
demands also include principles of international resource distribution. The more controversial 
such an index is, the less it can serve its purpose of guiding government policy. 
In the global formulations of Brundtland and Solow, as we have seen above, the capacity to 
satisfy needs, or the standard of life, respectively, are subject to constraints pertaining to the 
interests of future generations in these same dimensions of well-being. These are obviously 
constraints of a moral nature. Conceived very restrictively, sustainability in the original sense 
refers to dramatic issues in the morality of survival, of safeguarding the continuity of the 
human species on this planet as a whole. But in a broader and less dramatic sense well within 
the margins of survival, the original formulations have also introduced principles of 
intergenerational fairness, that is, of respecting the conditions for distributive shares of need-
satisfaction or life standards that could answer to a hypothetical reasoned agreement among 
parties separated in time. In this context, sustainability is a matter of doing at present what 
fairness requires for the future as far as this can be reasonably foreseen, rather than saving 
humanity as such. Though it is not easy to specify what these requirements are, exactly, the 
general nature of the requirements is well-understood in ordinary discourse. 
Passing now to the second argument, hardly anyone who uses this moral language of 
sustainability will suppose that people at present do not care at all about whether their 
descendants will be have access to sufficient quantities of clean air and water, a menu of 
high-quality consumption goods and the time to indulge in these, a peaceful and comfortable 
living environment, cultural heritage, stretches of wild nature to explore and so on. On the 
contrary, precisely because all these things are taken to be on the minds of members of the 
present generation – although undoubtedly to quite different extents – there is an excellent 
reason for working out this moral language in terms of definite principles from which clear 
and useful policy programs can then be derived. This obvious point implies that the language 
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of sustainability appeals to moral ties of social interdependence. However, in order to 
acknowledge the force of those ties, it is by no means necessary to suppose that the amount of 
well-being that we at present derive from the various amenities listed above depends on the 
amounts that might be enjoyed by our descendants, as the interdependency thesis of life 
quality and sustainability assumes. 
In an important way, that assumption is also misleading, at least on the squarely moral 
construal of interdependence which belongs to the original notion of sustainability that guides 
ordinary discourse. For on that construal, our concern for securing the conditions for an 
acceptable living standard of future generations is not primarily motivated by the self-
interested thought that the quality we now derive from our present living standard will be 
diminished, once we realise that this is at the expense of future generations ‘after the deluge’. 
It may or may not be in fact the case that selfish behaviour involving a violation of 
intergenerational morality causes discomfort, through the overwhelming shame or guilt from 
contemplating the harm that the behaviour potentially causes to future persons. But if this is 
true for someone, then taking that consideration into account in advance only produces a 
secondary prudential reason for good behaviour which entirely derives from the moral 
motive. In such cases, the subjective well-being of members of the present generation would 
indeed depend to some extent on the anticipated well-being of people later in time, but the 
reason why this would be so rests on a moral interdependence rather than on a fundamental 
interdependence in levels of well-being. But that moral interdependence does not cease to 
motivate persons whose feelings of guilt or shame are in fact not sufficient to wipe out the 
advantages of selfish behaviour that foreseeably would harm others in the future. And to 
repeat, as a matter of fact it is this moral interdependence to which the standard notions of 
(global) sustainability appeal. 
So far this shows that our first two arguments, taken together, produce a powerful case for 
keeping the moral constraints of sustainability vis-à-vis future generations apart from the 
metric of well-being. The case becomes more powerful once the third argument is brought in. 
To rephrase that argument: ideally, an index measure of life quality which is to be used for 
advising on sustainability policies within the mission of the Netherlands Environmental 
Assessment Agency should strive to be minimally controversial. Now as we will show in the 
next chapter, it is impossible to avoid deep controversies on how to understand and 
operationalize the concept of well-being or life quality for public purposes, and any 
reasonable proposal must be defended by addressing those controversies head-on. However, 
once one additionally takes the view that life quality and sustainability are in major ways 
interdependent, the degree of controversy that has to be faced becomes unmanageable. This is 
already easy to see from our discussion above. If one wants to maintain that life quality at 
present negatively depends on the extent to which life quality in the future is thought to be 
endangered, then it becomes necessary to quantify such ties of interdependence in order to be 
able to measure individual scores on an index of life quality, after correcting for the 
interdependence in similar ways as is done in ISEW-indexes. But since different people have 
different ideas both about what they owe future generations and about what risks their 
behaviour foreseeably imposes on these, disagreements on such correction factors are 
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unavoidable. Once the nationally oriented concept of sustainability which we discussed in 1.2 
is adopted, this problem is multiplied. In a national orientation, the morality of sustainability 
is widened to include norms and principles of international justice and solidarity alongside 
intergenerational norms and principles. This makes it even more difficult to avoid 
controversial assumptions regarding interdependency, and we therefore think that for this 
reason alone, it is better not to include prescriptions of sustainability in the metric of life 
quality itself. 
We want to stress that social interdependencies based upon international morality can also be 
handled if sustainability norms are kept separate from the metric of life quality, and illustrate 
this by a simple example. On almost every conception of global distributive justice, as well as 
on widely shared understandings of human rights conventions, Dutch citizens are confronted 
with powerful moral reasons for accepting a somewhat lower quality of life for themselves at 
home, if this sacrifice really helps to eliminate or avoid life-threatening poverty elsewhere. 
For on almost any conception of what constitutes life quality, such poverty is a great harm 
indeed. Of course it is a fact of life that these moral reasons are not easily translated into 
direct action. Now suppose that in order to reinforce the motive for fighting poverty abroad 
among Dutch citizens, the official index of life quality for the Netherlands is made sensitive 
to the actual state of poverty in the world, by incorporating some kind of negative correction 
factor. This factor would have to depend on factual estimates of a global poverty count, on 
how far Dutch people are above the UNDP or World Bank poverty line on average, and on 
the actual state of performance of the Netherlands with respect to international poverty 
alleviation. Even if there is agreement on all of these facts, it will be quite hard to combine 
them in a non-arbitrary way. And thus, just as is the case with the ISEW-indexes, any attempt 
to quantify the ‘loss of life quality’ that would supposedly be caused by a failure to meet the 
anti-poverty requirement of sustainability will immediately invite unnecessary controversies 
regarding the size of the correction factor. But worse still, adjusting the index of life quality 
in this way might actually weaken the moral willingness among the population to support 
global poverty alleviation programs at some personal cost to themselves. For calculations 
based upon an officially accepted correction factor could show that some optimal amount of 
transfer to the global poor would actually be serving the (adjusted) quality of life of some in 
the Netherlands, but possibly not of others. By introducing this dimension of self-interest into 
the issue of Dutch contributions to the removal of poverty elsewhere, that issue would 
become even more complicated than it already is in practice. 
Of course it might be thought that alleviation of global poverty is in fact in the longer-term 
self-interest of all people in the Netherlands, because this might help protecting international 
peace and stability, and thus increase the prospect of maintaining world trade from which the 
Dutch economy profits. But even under this purely prudential motive for aiding the global 
poor there is no good reason for incorporating some kind of global poverty correction factor 
into the index of life quality. It would be far better to face the alleged threat of stability 
directly, by including objectives of international poverty alleviation among the Dutch concern 
for promoting the conditions of life quality at home under the primary goal of sustainability 
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in cell (1) of Table 1.1, rather than including them only under the sustainability constraints of 
helping people out of their present state of poverty elsewhere (cell (2a)). 
To sum up so far, independently of how quality of life is measured, there are many different 
reasons – both moral and prudential – for policies that place restrictions upon its pursuit in 
the short run for the present generation at home. A national conception of sustainable life 
quality must be able to state and discuss these reasons, without suggesting that every single 
policy of sustainability is motivated by the desire to optimise ‘adjusted’ life quality here and 
now. The idea of incorporating objectives and constraints of sustainability into the metric of 
life quality unintentionally invites this misunderstanding. As we have argued, the idea also 
invites unnecessary controversy and does not properly reflect the many-sided concerns of 
morality that are part of the discourse of sustainability. 
As Neumayer observes, this also holds for demands of sustainability which are not 
immediately concerned with the distribution of global income, such as preventing depletion 
of natural and environmental resources. Here it also seems defensible to take account of such 
resources in an index of life quality only insofar as these affect the population at home 
directly. Thus for example the index would have to be sensitive to the state of affairs with 
respect to clean air and water, as well as to noise overload from traffic on roads and airports. 
Arguably however, concern for protecting the important value of biodiversity – a non-
regenerable element of natural heritage as well as, possibly, part of ecological stability 
conditions – should not enter into the index. It should rather be included among the four types 
of sustainability conditions listed in the cells of Table 1.1 (depending on the exact nature of 
biodiversity requirements), unless it can be shown that life quality of the population in the 
Netherlands would be immediately affected by certain changes in biodiversity. This is also in 
line with the fact that the international commitments undertaken by the Dutch government to 
contribute towards biodiversity objectives are primarily intended as safeguarding the global 
potential for satisfying human needs in the future. Here as well, it is both unnecessary and 
confusing to incorporate the extent to which such commitments are actually met into an index 
of life quality by way of some – inevitably contestable – correction factor. 
In a democratic regime, policies of sustainability must ideally be underwritten by clear 
political commitments based upon previous undertakings by the government, and must be 
supported by public debate in the light of accepted scientific knowledge. As we have argued 
in 1.3, the advisory task of the MNP may be enhanced by systematic inventory research on 
the different kinds of sustainability requirements which are in play in this process, and by 
reporting on the possible consequences of these requirements for pursuing objectives of 
improving the quality of life in the Netherlands. This is a difficult task, because the MNP 
takes the position that such advice should proceed from a policy-relevant index of life 
quality, which summarizes key quality indicators across several domains of social life. In this 
section we hope to have shown that the task will not become any easier if moral and political 
demands of sustainability are conceptually interwoven with the metric in which quality of life 
is expressed. We now proceed to the main part of our assignment in the next two chapters, 
which deals with the conceptual and measurement choices that have to be faced in working 
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out a policy-relevant index of life quality. In Chapter 4, we then present some concluding 
reflections on the relationship between life quality and sustainability in the context of the 
MNP Sustainability Outlook. 
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2 Three approaches to the quality of life 
 
 
In this chapter we discuss three theoretical approaches for conceptualising and measuring the 
quality of life: the resource approach (2.1), the subjective well-being approach (2.2), and the 
capability approach (2.3). In the final section (2.4) we show how these three approaches 
relate to each other, and state our reasons for believing that the capability approach is to be 
preferred as the foundation for a measure of the quality of life over the available alternatives. 
 
2.1 The resource approach 
 
To conceive quality of life in terms of resources is a liberal approach, and can be based on 
both narrow and broader conceptualisations of resources. We will discuss this approach at 
some length both in its own right and because the notion of resources will be useful in the 
further development of a capability-based conceptualisation of life quality, as will be 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.1.1 Liberal reluctance about the quality of life 
Theories based on resources start from the classical liberal premise that each adult person 
should judge for herself what the good life consists in. Adults are assumed to have the 
capacity to make such judgements, and are therefore held responsible for whether their 
attempt to realise their idea of the good life succeeds or fails, assuming that each person 
enjoys a fair share of resources. Thus a necessary condition of letting people free in the 
pursuit of their own conceptions of a good life is that the resources which are needed to 
realise any such conception are distributed fairly.3 This means that the resource approach to 
life quality does not endorse specific views on the good life, subject to the harm constraint 
that each person should be empowered to lead his own life as long as this does not prevent 
others from doing likewise. This theory is strongly anti-paternalistic. Since it is assumed that 
the government is well-advised to stay away from the question what the best way of life is, its 
mandate for pre-emptive action to protect the interests of persons who are thought to act 
contrary to their own good is severely limited (to prescribing safety belts and the like). On a 
strong version of this theory, the government is under a moral obligation to refrain from 
working out an interpersonally valid measure of the quality of life for public purposes. The 
                                                 
3 In political philosophy the main authors who defend resource-based theories are John Rawls (1999) and Ronald Dworkin (2000). 
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government should not even want to raise the question ‘what do we mean by quality of life?’ 
since this sort of inquiry falls outside its legitimate domain of action. Rather, the government 
should organise society in such a way that citizens are enabled to generate their own all-
purpose means to live a good life according to their own views, and it should redistribute 
those means to citizens who are unable to take care of themselves for no fault of their own. 
These all-purpose means for a good life are commonly labelled as ‘resources’. In a narrow 
economic interpretation, resources are typically limited to financial means, either income or 
imputed values of public goods. But far broader definitions are encountered in disciplines 
other than economics. Political philosophers, in particular, have investigated the large range 
of resources that are arguably needed for well-being or quality of life, independently of the 
different views that persons hold about its content. An example of such a broad definition is 
found in the work of John Rawls (1999), who in A Theory of Justice describes resources as 
‘social primary goods’. These include liberties, opportunities (such as equal opportunity to 
enter all occupations), income, wealth, and even the ‘social bases of self-respect’ that the 
rules and norms of society provide to individuals. The basic idea is that the quality of life of 
human beings will be guaranteed if society reproduces these resources in a fair distribution. 
The resource-based theory about human well-being deliberately refrains from making any 
additional claims about what individuals and groups should actually do with these resources. 
The fact that a project for measuring the quality of life for public policy is in contradiction 
with the liberal principles behind the resource-based theory raises the question whether we 
should be considering that theory at all here. Is it not the case that this approach insists on 
removing any inquiry on the content of a quantifiable notion of life quality from the public 
agenda? This is indeed the case. Yet we think it is justified to discuss the resource approach 
as one possible conceptual foundation of the quality of life, precisely because it rejects 
attempts to construct an interpersonally comparable measure of the quality of life that people 
would derive from their resources. If one adopts a broad definition of resources - understood 
always as ‘all-purpose means’ - then one can defend the view that for public purposes, the 
quality of life enjoyed by individuals in a society can be deduced from the resources that 
those individuals are able to command. Comparisons of individual entitlements to resources 
thereby cover both individually owned goods, as well as access to broadly conceived 
collective goods provided by society, hence including legally guaranteed rights and 
opportunities. Thus from the liberal perspective of the resource-based theory, the 
conceptualisation of life quality must consist in sketching a legitimate and publicly defensible 
view of strategically important conditions for realizing a wide diversity of individual 
convictions on what the good life consists in. Such a public view may then form the basis for 
the construction of a resources-index of life quality.  
The problem with this is that in practice, liberal political philosophers such as Rawls and 
Dworkin do not use the resource approach for this goal, perhaps because they endorse the 
strict interpretation, which holds that the quality of life is not an public issue at all. As a 
consequence, it may seem that these philosophers are not actively engaged with questions 
about the quality of life, but are only concerned about the just distribution of resources. To 
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some extent this is true, and in any case it opens the field for more narrow-minded versions of 
the resource approach in which per capita income is the only relevant all-purpose means. 
2.1.2 National income and purchasing power: a narrow view of 
resources 
This leads us into economic theories about the quality of life and their applications in public 
policy. At the macro-level, the dominant resource is GNP per capita. Economists have 
repeatedly argued that GNP per capita is not an indicator of well-being (Jackson et al., 1997; 
Neumayer, 1999). GNP is a price-based measure of total economic production, and has 
originally been designed as an indicator for macro-economic stabilisation policies in the post-
war period (Neumayer, 1999: 90). From a theoretical point of view this is perfectly true, but 
in practice GNP is often being used as a proxy for the quality of life, as these same 
economists acknowledge. GNP (or its changes over time - economic growth) has developed 
into a powerful indicator for the level of ‘welfare’ in a country. Many social scientists claim 
that these economic indicators dominate public discourse about how well a country is faring 
and also serve to justify governmental policies for enhancing quality of life (e.g. Diener and 
Seligman, 2004: 2; Cummins et al., 2003: 160-161). Nevertheless, the problems of using 
GNP as an indicator of the well-being of a country are well-known, such as the exclusive 
focus on the monetary market value of goods and services, or the problem that negative and 
positive externalities are ignored. 
At the micro-level economists translate the narrow resource approach into analyses of 
disposable household income. Welfare economics holds that, under certain conditions, real 
net income can be used as an indicator of individual welfare. In reality these conditions are 
generally not met. In theory, refined empirical estimations can take some of these missing 
welfare effects into account, such as the welfare effects of externalities and public goods, or 
the welfare effects of non-market labour or differences in available leisure time. But in 
practice achieving such empirical estimations at the individual level is very difficult both for 
econometric reasons and lack of appropriate data (Kuklys and Robeyns, 2005). 
There is nothing in the concept of resources that forces us to narrow it down to income. 
Several other kinds of resources are instrumental for realising one’s idea of the good life, in 
particular free time. Moreover, resources can be individual but also collective. Examples are 
natural talents and health, public infrastructure such as roads and public transport, and social 
institutions such as a well-functioning legal order. We will return to this broad 
conceptualisation of resources, but it is good to keep in mind that often, public policies are 
exclusively sensitive to financial resource calculations of cost and benefit, sometimes 
complemented with other monetary valuations of non-priced public goods. 
2.1.3 Evaluation of the resource-based approach 
The dominant position that financial resources have gained in the design and evaluation of 
public policies has led to two different points of criticism. The first critique is aimed at the 
simplistic but nevertheless very influential idea that the more money we can spend, the better 
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off we are. This line argues that our quality of life is not determined by how wealthy we are, 
but by our subjective well-being: the satisfaction with our own life, or the degree to which we 
are happy. This approach will be discussed at more length below. But at this point we want to 
mention one important result from the happiness literature: at the country aggregate level, the 
subjective well-being of people (either their satisfaction with life or their experience of 
happiness), is only weakly correlated with per capita income above a certain threshold. 
International comparisons have shown that the average subjective well-being of a population 
is positively correlated with GNP per capita until this reaches about $10.000; for higher 
income levels the positive correlation between the level of GNP per capita and average 
subjective well-being largely disappears (Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 416). For example, the 
GNP of the USA has tripled in the last 50 years, but the general satisfaction with life has been 
almost constant, and similar results have been found for other western countries and Japan 
(Diener and Seligman, 2004: 3; Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 413). 
The second line of critique on income indicators comes from the capability approach. This 
approach will be discussed in detail in 2.3. The capability critique consists of two parts. The 
first part criticises the narrow resource approach, by invoking the broad conceptualisation of 
resources developed in political philosophy in order to highlight the significance of human 
diversity: different people need different types and amounts of resources, since they have 
different needs and preferences. A crippled person may have enough money to buy a 
wheelchair, but if buses and buildings are not accessible to wheelchairs, then this strongly 
limits to what he or she can do. Similarly, compared to childless adults, parents who are tied 
down for lack of childcare arrangements are at a disadvantage for access to income through 
the labour market or the unemployment benefit system. Purely financial indicators of welfare 
are thus in danger of taking insufficient account of human diversity across a broader spectrum 
of resources. 
The second capability critique is more principled and also applies to broader resource 
accounts. The capability approach argues that ‘resourcism’ confuses means with ends. It 
argues that we first need to know what the ultimate ends of the good life are, since otherwise 
we cannot judge whether income, rights, opportunities and so forth are relevant and 
appropriate resources, or whether some other means might be more effective. All-purpose 
means are by definition only instrumental for reaching certain goals or outcomes, some of 
which have an intrinsic value that we want to include in our concept of ‘life quality’. 
According to the capability approach, then, we have to proceed by inquiring into widely 
shared ends of the good life in our society, and subsequently work out the corresponding 
means in our attempts to advance the quality of life. 
Obviously, to criticize resource-based indicators is one thing; the hard question remains 
whether one can find indicators which properly reflect the quality of life, and which have 
sufficiently robust theoretical foundations for attaining the same public power as is currently 
enjoyed by the summary measure of per capita GNP. To examine this question, we now 
examine the alternative approaches. 
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2.2 The subjective well-being approach 
2.2.1 What counts is happiness or satisfaction 
As mentioned above, the first alternative is the subjective approach. It is based on the 
assumption that the quality of life coincides with the subjective experiences of a person, 
expressed in terms of utility, happiness, or satisfaction. We will use these three terms 
interchangeably unless their distinguishing features are relevant for the analysis. Satisfaction 
can be expressed in terms of overall satisfaction with life, or satisfaction on particular 
domains, such as income, health, family relationships, labour, and so forth. 
In the last few decades significant progress has been made in research on subjective well-
being by an international network of economists and psychologists, such as Clark and Oswald 
(1996), Diener and Seligman (2004), Frey and Stutzer (2002), Kahneman and Krueger 
(2006), Layard (2005), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004), and Veenhoven (2000, 
2002a). A number of these scholars, in particular Layard, have concluded that sufficient 
scientific progress has been made for public policies to start focusing on subjective well-
being. The measures of subjective well-being have been tested and refined, and much is 
supposed to be known about the determinants of happiness that the government can 
influence. Nevertheless, significant developments are still taking place within this field of 
research, and there is no consensus on some important questions which we will discuss in 
2.2.4 below. 
In the Netherlands two prominent scholars have long been working in the area of subjective 
well-being measurement: the psychologist Ruut Veenhoven, and the economist Bernard van 
Praag. They each represent one major school within the subjective well-being approach: the 
school which focuses on general life satisfaction (Veenhoven) and the approach which links 
satisfaction on particular domains to general satisfaction (van Praag). 
2.2.2 Overall life satisfaction 
In his inaugural lecture, Ruut Veenhoven proposes to define the ‘container-concept’ of 
happiness in terms of reported over-all life satisfaction. Following Diener (1984), life 
satisfaction is understood as a concept that combines two components: how we normally feel 
in everyday life – the affective, or ‘hedonistic’ component – and how we judge the degree to 
which our preferences and aspirations in life have been realised – the cognitive component 
(Veenhoven, 2002a: 10). It is important to note that at the level of overall life satisfaction, 
both of these components are held to combine in a synthetic expression of well-being, in 
which both our emotions as well as our cognitive faculties play a role, in an intuitive 
equilibrium in which the emotions dominate. In measurements of life satisfaction obtained 
from limited domains of social life, however, it is normally thought that the cognitive 
component of the respondents plays a larger role, and thus these measurements do not 
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reliably pick up the affective dimension of subjective well-being. Therefore Veenhoven 
argues that it is better to focus on overall life satisfaction. We return to this point below. 
In order to find out how ‘happy’ a person is, Veenhoven asks his respondents for example to 
rate how satisfied they are with their life on a scale from 1 to 10. In another method he asks 
the respondents to imagine the worst possible life and to give that life a value of 0, to imagine 
the best possible life and give that a value of 10, and then to rate their own life on a scale 
from 0 to 10. These methods of measuring life satisfaction are widely used, not only by 
Veenhoven. They exist in many variants, but Veenhoven has collected and ordered almost all 
data on life satisfaction in a large database: ‘the World Happiness Database’ 
(http://www1.eur.nl/fsw/happiness). 
Thus to understand why the term ‘happiness’ is most often used as the catchword of the 
subjective well-being approach, it suffices to note (apart from referring to Bentham’s slogan 
‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’) that the term has acquired a set of precise 
operational meanings in the World Happiness Database. The questionnaires included do not 
only collect information on life satisfaction, but similar questions are also asked about 
‘happiness’ in its everyday connotation, the extent to which respondents report that they feel 
happy with their overall life situation. The aim of such questions is to measure the affective 
component of subjective well-being. Research into the affective component of well-being has 
received an additional impulse by the work of Daniel Kahneman and his colleagues 
(Kahneman et al., 2004; Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). They developed a refined method 
for measuring nasty and pleasurable experiences in short intervals of daily time spending, 
resulting in several measures of subjective happiness. According to these authors those 
measures are useful for research on the quality of life which focuses on the allocation of time 
in micro-situations. However, this research is still in its infancy, and we will not discuss it 
extensively here. 
Veenhoven (2002a) claims that overall life satisfaction is the best measure for the 
conceptualisation and measurement of the quality of life. Just as Layard (2005, chapter 8), 
Veenhoven takes the position of ‘new utilitarianism’ (Veenhoven, 2002a: 37-38). Overall life 
satisfaction should be adopted as the official ‘policy guide’, and the task of the government is 
to aim for the highest possible average level of life satisfaction. For comparisons in the long 
term, Veenhoven also proposes to measure the quality of life based on ‘happy life 
expectancy’. This is an index obtained from multiplying life expectancy in a country with 
average overall life satisfaction (Veenhoven, 1996). 
 
2.2.3 Satisfaction on domains 
In their book Happiness Quantified Bernard van Praag and Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) 
build on more than 30 years of econometric research by Van Praag and his colleagues. They 
believe that standard 20th century welfare economics, which holds subjective well-being to be 
ordinally measurable and interpersonally incomparable can be complemented with an 
empirically based welfare economics, which defines subjective well-being as the reported 
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satisfaction of respondents at a higher level of measurement and which does allow for 
interpersonal comparison (2004: chapter 1). In contrast to Veenhoven, Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell apply subjective well-being measurement to domains of social life, such as 
satisfaction with health, employment, financial position, leisure time, the environment, social 
life, and marriage. For each of these areas, they analyse the most important determinants of 
domain-specific satisfaction. The aim is find out how overall life satisfaction (measured in a 
similar way as is done in Veenhoven’s research) hangs together with subjective indicators of 
satisfaction in the different domains. This research also contributes to a better understanding 
of mental adaptation processes and of the influence of reference groups on satisfaction. For 
example, a raise in income of one’s neighbours is shown to have a strong and significant 
negative effect on one’s overall life satisfaction (2004: 159). 
The major advantage of this approach is that different levels at which subjective well-being is 
experienced are integrated into one single model. Well-being responds to mechanisms that 
differ over the domains. One of the most significant findings emerging from the work of Van 
Praag and his colleagues is that some domains are characterised by positional goods, whereas 
in other domains this is not the case, or at least not significantly.4 This can have major 
consequences for governmental policies, as we will discuss below. Note that the work of Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell aims primarily to give the foundations (and partial 
operationalization) of a new approach to welfare economics. In contrast to, for example, 
Veenhoven (2002a: chapter 5) and Layard (2005: 111-125), these authors do not hold that 
utilitarianism – aiming for maximum average utility – is the dominant policy criterion. They 
are aware that there can be good reasons to give weight to other values than the average level 
of satisfaction when making policy choices. This emerges, for example, from their discussion 
how much compensation families should receive for each additional child, in order for them 
to keep families at the same level of financial satisfaction (2004: 24). Affluent households 
need, in absolute amounts, more financial compensation than less affluent households. But 
Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell notice that this will be politically unacceptable for many, 
since there are good reasons why policy makers might choose for other compensation 
systems. “The only point is that such a system is not welfare-neutral anymore” (2004: 24-25). 
These two economists are thus concerned with finding a systematic method to measure 
satisfaction, both at the level of domains as well as for life overall, to model the determinants 
of satisfaction, and to employ this knowledge in applied welfare economics. 
 
2.2.4 Evaluation of the subjective approach 
Is the subjective approach the best basis for conceptualising and measuring the quality of 
life? The approach certainly has a number of attractive features. Firstly, it puts the human 
being central stage, rather than focusing on the means that human beings use to improve their 
                                                 
4 Positional goods are goods of which the subjective valuation depends strongly on the amounts of this good that are possessed by 
other people belonging to the reference group of this person. The term was coined by Hirsch (1976) in his influential The Social 
Limits to Growth.  
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quality of life. Hence the approach satisfies the criterion that means and ends should not be 
conceptually confused. Secondly, in considering means to happiness, the subjective approach 
is not limited to material means, which is the major shortcoming of the dominant economic 
methods. Income has only a limited (but not unimportant) role to play in this approach. But 
there are some concerns which we want to raise regarding the subjective approach as the 
preferred route towards an index of the quality of life. Four emerge as especially relevant: 
problems of mental adaptation and social comparisons, group-differences in subjective well-
being judgements, and the usefulness for policy within a country at lower levels of policy 
making. Finally, there is the ontological question to what extent happiness can be said to 
reflect the quality of life, rather than being a by-product. We will review these four issues one 
by one. 
 
(i) Mental adaptation and social comparisons 
Our satisfaction is to some extent influenced by mental adaptation problems which emerge 
from comparisons with the situation of others. This can have problematic implications for 
public policies aiming at the highest happiness for the greatest number. Take the mental 
adaptation processes first. How do these emerge? 
First of all, there can be shocks in our lives that have a major effect on our quality of life, 
such as immobility after an accident. Persons confronted with a major setback in health and 
mobility through such a handicap will first experience a strong deterioration of their 
subjective well-being, but after a while this effect will weaken. Obviously this adaptation to 
circumstances is good for the disabled, since they do not remain deeply unhappy for the rest 
of their lives due to their limited abilities to move around without pain. However, the 
question is what this implies for policies. A utilitarian will say that the government has to 
limit itself to creating provisions such that the disabled can return to an acceptable level of 
life satisfaction, taking into account the corresponding welfare costs for others. But one could 
also argue that a cost-sensitive policy has to try to reach an acceptable level of functioning for 
these people, even if this makes little difference in their subjective judgement about their 
well-being, after adapting to the accident. Subjective indicators focus automatically on the 
first goal, but this may imply that these quality aspects that relate to the things a person still 
can do after the accident remain out of sight. 
Secondly, people can adapt to an objective disadvantage that is not caused by an external 
shock, but that shows a more stable pattern. Amartya Sen (1993, 2005) has pointed out 
repeatedly that people living at the very bottom of the social ladder (such as ‘exploited 
labourers’ or ‘oppressed housewives’) adapt to their situation and come to suffer less 
intensely. Another example is the effect of racism. If a society becomes gradually less 
tolerant towards cultural minorities, and increasingly accepts racist practices, then cultural 
minorities might get used to a racist social climate. Perhaps they will change their behaviour, 
in order to avoid contact with openly racist people. By changing their behaviour and mentally 
preparing for racist practices, it is possible that after a while the negative well-being effect of 
racism on minority groups will be partially wiped out. However, a policy that anticipates such 
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adaptation processes is problematic from a democratic perspective: racism should not be 
tolerated in society, even if it turns out to have no significant impact on the subjective well-
being of its victims.5 
Another form of mental adaptation which is relevant for the government is the adjustment 
response to income changes. Subjective well-being judgements about income have been 
shown to adapt asymmetrically to income changes. Income increases go together with higher 
aspirations for the future, with only one third of the increase being reflected by improvements 
of subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2002, Layard 2005). Panel-analysis over a period 
of ten years shows that we adapt strongly to an increase in income, but much less so to a drop 
in income (Burchardt 2005b). Thus if people change positions in an income distribution 
which itself remains unchanged, then aggregate satisfaction of the population will decrease. 
The people who move up the ladder will be more satisfied for a short time, but quickly adapt 
to the new situation, whereas people who move downwards experience larger drop in 
satisfaction – and this effect lasts longer as well. Tania Burchardt (2005a) argues that due to 
similar phenomena of adaptation, people’s positions in the distribution of income, health and 
marital status should preferably remain immobile, according to utilitarianism. Clearly this is a 
policy conclusion that goes against the principle that people should receive equal 
opportunities, even if the effect of one person’s upward social mobility is not compensated by 
the effect of another person’s downward social mobility. 
How serious are these problems of mental adaptation for the subjective approach? In part our 
response to this question depends on our normative judgements about the counter-intuitive 
and sometimes perverse policy implications of a policy that single-mindedly aims at 
promoting maximal average utility. It also depends, however, on the empirical question how 
strong these mental adaptation processes are in reality. Earlier on we noted that Veenhoven 
regards life satisfaction on domains as a less reliable indicator of ‘happiness’ than overall life 
satisfaction. The reason is that the intuitive judgements on domains such as income, 
education or marriage, seem to be more strongly based on cognitive judgements rather than 
on affective moods. If that is true, and if mental adaptation caused by changes in 
circumstances are primarily based on cognitive processes, then subjective well-being 
experienced in (at least some) domains will be more strongly influenced by such adaptations 
than it is at the overall level. According to Veenhoven, overall life satisfaction is indeed 
primarily determined by the affective component, and therefore it is much less vulnerable to 
the effects of mental adaptation. 
Before examining this point in more detail below, we return to the findings that subjective 
well-being is also strongly influenced by social comparisons with reference groups. In 
particular, the well-being effect of income, but also of education, is affected by the levels 
reached by members of the reference groups to which individuals compare their own 
                                                 
5 Utilitarians would object to this argument that legislation to ban racism will make society in the long run and all things considered 
happier (the ‘rule-utilitarian response’). However, our point here is that such legislation already exists, and enforcing it becomes 
more difficult if one claims, based on mental adaptation processes, that minorities should not complain about increasing levels of 
racism since these hardly affect their happiness. 
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situation. As a consequence increases in income, or additional educational credentials, 
contribute less to satisfaction in these domains, the more income or educational progress is 
achieved within the reference groups. Apparently, these resources have a stronger positional 
component than other resources do, in particular leisure time, where the comparison effect 
appears to have a much weaker impact on well-being obtained from an additional unit of free 
time (Griffith 2005). Much research has been done on these cognitive processes, among 
others by the school of Van Praag. The panel-analysis of Burchardt (2005b) and the research 
reported in Kahneman and Krueger (2006) also investigate how effects of social comparisons 
made in the past impact on present well-being. This research thus integrates social 
comparisons with processes of mental adaptation. 
What is the problem if we adopt a measure of the quality of life in which quality strongly 
depends on a person’s relative resource position in several reference groups? Defenders of 
the subjective well-being approach rightly claim that uncovering these dependencies in 
psychometric and econometric research has made a major contribution to the insight that 
more income and more consumption do not make us happier above a certain threshold level 
(Nickerson et al. 2003 ; Layard 2005). We agree, but at the same time these mechanisms 
strongly focus attention on devising policy strategies of eliminating or reducing the effects of 
social comparisons. But it is hard to envisage a set of acceptable policies that would 
drastically minimise rivalrous behaviour of people, or would create a society in which the 
many reference groups to which people orient themselves cease to influence their subjective 
well-being. It may therefore be better to search for indicators of quality of life that put less 
stress on subjective well-being and more on objective factors.6 
In the meantime, all of this hardly poses a problem to Veenhoven, since he holds that 
‘happiness’ (understood as overall life satisfaction in the quote that follows) is not a matter of 
social comparison (Veenhoven 2002a: 26-27): 
“if happiness can be found in being better off than the neighbours, then within one 
country there must be about as many happy as unhappy people, and the average 
should be around 5, an a scale from 0 to 10. However, [we have] seen that the average 
is far above neutral” (our translation). 
But this rebuttal is insufficient. The critics do not argue that happiness (in the sense of life 
satisfaction) is completely determined by comparisons with all neighbours or other potential 
reference groups. In that case average happiness would indeed be in the middle of the scale. 
The arguments say that social comparisons with selected reference groups play a significant 
role, not that they can account entirely for scores on reported life satisfaction. In addition 
Veenhoven (2002a: 26) argues: 
                                                 
6 We believe that the earlier mentioned findings of the differences in the degrees in which income and leisure time have a positional 
character, are of great importance to the subjective approach. Whether these findings should lead to the far-reaching changes in the 
fiscal policies as advocated by Layard (2005, chapter 10) – an increase in the tax on labour and subsidies to leisure activities – is a 
question we will not investigate here. 
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“If happiness is a matter of comparison, then relative welfare would be more 
important than absolute welfare, but we have seen the opposite above” (our 
translation). 
This strong statement is not supported by Layard (2005), and it also goes against the findings 
of Clark and Oswald (1996) and those of Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004: chapter 8). 
Moreover, Veenhoven’s claim that it is precisely cognitively based measures of satisfaction 
which are susceptible to mechanisms of social comparison and mental adaptation, has been 
put into question. The work of Kahneman and Krueger (2006: 17-18) shows that mental 
adaptation processes are clearly present even when predominantly affective measures of 
overall happiness experiences are adopted. 
In conclusion, there seems to be little consensus in the subjective well-being literature on the 
question whether and to what extent phenomena of mental adaptation and reference groups 
cause problems for the measurement of overall life satisfaction. However, all researchers do 
acknowledge that satisfaction on some domains is susceptible to these phenomena, and this 
may result in the counter-intuitive policy implications we mentioned earlier. 
 
(ii) Group-differences in subjective well-being judgements 
The subjective well-being approach focuses on the affective and cognitive responses of 
people to how their lives go overall, or in particular domains. If groups differ on average in 
their responses to a situation, then this may cause problems for policies, if those differences 
correlate with the objective circumstances that one would intuitively judge as important. 
There are two symmetric possibilities: (1) groups who are in the same objective situation 
have different levels of life satisfaction, or (2) groups with the same level of life satisfaction 
are in different situations, whereby it is clear that one situation is worse than the other 
independently of subjective well-being. 
Research has indeed shown that the average level of life satisfaction between demographic 
groups differs systematically. In other words, if we control for the relevant factors, then some 
groups are significantly less satisfied with their lives than others. For example, recent 
Australian research (Cummins et al., 2003) shows that women report a higher level of overall 
life satisfaction than men, after taking a number of control-variables into account.7 The 
researchers cannot pinpoint the exact causes of this finding, but they do not exclude the 
possibility that women are ‘constitutionally’ more satisfied than men. This may have a 
biological explanation, but it may also be the consequence of processes of adaptation that 
men and women experience differently over their lifetimes. 
The question is how government should deal with these findings. From a utilitarian 
perspective it would be efficient to develop a policy that is advantageous to men. For 
example, if due to unemployment men experience a larger drop in happiness than women (as 
                                                 
7 A similar strong and significant gender-effect has been found in recent unpublished research by Lina Eriksson, James M. Rice, and 
Robert E. Goodin (in progress), ‘Temporal aspects of life satisfaction’, mimeo, Research School of the Social Sciences, ANU. 
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reported by Frey and Stutzer, 2002: 419), then a policy that gives men priority on the labour 
market will minimise the average damage in terms of happiness. But the fact that one 
demographic group (women, the worst off, the elderly, and so forth) are made less unhappy 
due to a certain event than other groups, can cause perverse policy implications if life 
satisfaction is declared to be the guideline for policies. Fundamental political principles such 
as non-discrimination and equality of opportunities for all citizens are thereby put into 
jeopardy. This would also be true in the symmetric case where the average level of life 
satisfaction of discriminated or marginalized groups does not differ significantly from the 
average level of a group that is not faced with these disadvantages. We do not want to claim 
here that the subjective well-being approach will always lead to such injustices. But we do 
think that a central focus on subjective well-being will make policies less sensitive to 
signalling and combating these injustices. Hence we join Burchardt (2005b: 94) who argues 
that “… satisfaction – the best proxy we have for the concept of utility- is unsuitable for 
assessing current well-being, justice or equality.” 
 
(iii) Applicability at the national and regional levels of policy making 
The third question is whether the subjective well-being indicators are sufficiently refined and 
sensitive for policy at lower levels of aggregation than the level of a country. In their 
discussion of the criteria that an index of the quality of life should meet, Hagerty and his co-
authors (2001: 2) include the criterion that the index must help policy makers to develop and 
evaluate policies at all levels of aggregation. Thus, the index should not only be useful for the 
national government, but also for governments in cities, communities, and regions. 
Overall life satisfaction does not satisfactorily meet this criterion. This indicator is too crude 
for these purposes. Life satisfaction is less suitable for the evaluation of specific policy 
interventions (Veenhoven, 2002a: 34; Cummins et al., 2003).8 The effect of one policy 
measure such as improved child care facilities will hardly or not at all be reflected in reported 
overall life satisfaction, even if such policies have significant effects on the real opportunities 
of parents to organise their lives as they think is best. Overall ‘happy life expectancy’ is, by 
contrast, well-suited for comparing the effects of fundamental political and economic 
institutions on subjective well-being. This emerges clearly from the work of Veenhoven, 
which concentrates on studies whereby the unit of analysis is the country. In other words, 
Veenhoven mainly uses happy life expectancy as an indicator for macro-analysis. The 
variables that emerge as the determinants of happy life expectancy are therefore typically 
system-variables such as the degree of political freedom, or the presence of rule of law. But 
the quality of life in a micro-situation (say, living in a particular community or 
neighbourhood) is also influenced by many other variables. 
                                                 
8 We are therefore rather puzzled by the claim of Hagerty et al. that Veenhoven’s index of happy life expectancy meets their 
criterion that the index should have a clear policy focus, and should be useful for policy makers to evaluate programs at all levels of 
aggregation. 
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Is this objection also valid for the other school within the subjective well-being approach, 
where life satisfaction is measured at the level of particular domains, such as satisfaction with 
labour, income or family-life? According to Cummins et al (2003) these indicators are 
sufficiently refined to evaluate the effects of specific policy measures. But apart from the 
problem that domain-specific indicators of life satisfaction are susceptible to mental 
adaptation and social comparison, their applicability for policies is problematic, since it is as 
yet insufficiently clear how domain-specific indicators of life satisfaction can be influenced. 
In the empirical models presented by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, the explained 
variation in domain-satisfaction is often very small. The authors report (pseudo-) R2 of 0.03 
and lower. This means that the independent variables, taken together, do not explain more 
than 3% of the differences in domain-specific satisfaction in the data of the model. This 
suggests that life satisfaction at the micro-level is to a very limited extent determined by 
variables that are within the control of policy makers.9 
 
(iv) The ontological question: is happiness quality of life or is it a by-product? 
We want to conclude our discussion by asking the ontological question what quality of life is, 
and whether the answer provided by the subjective well-being approach to that question is 
satisfying. Are all aspects of the ‘quality of life’ ultimately reducible to life satisfaction? 
Research cited by Veenhoven shows, among other things, that Dutch people attach more 
importance to health than to anything else. From a philosophical perspective, one can ask 
whether health is important only insofar as it contributes to life satisfaction or happiness, or 
also because it has intrinsic value, that is, has value in and of itself. If someone is in good 
health, is this a good thing only because health contributes to subjective well-being? Strictly 
speaking, this is the logical implication of the subjective approach to quality of life. But if we 
accept the implication, then we must regard health as a purely instrumental factor. We can 
ask similar questions regarding labour, knowledge, appreciating art and culture, and intimate 
relationships. If all these things are to be valued purely, or even primarily, because of their 
contribution to overall or specific life satisfaction, then we would want to say this is a 
misrecognition of the contribution they make to how well our lives go. 
We therefore think that this view is untenable. Ultimately, quality of life is not about how 
satisfied you are with life, or how happy you are. Hedonistic well-being and judgements of 
satisfaction rather seem to be by-products. How well you are feeling, or how satisfied you are 
with your life rather follows from the quality of the life you are leading – and this may even 
not be the case invariably. What the quality of life precisely is cannot be captured by a single 
experiential or cognitive formula. Quality of life may be something that stands much closer to 
our concrete living processes: the degree in which we can function well, given our views of 
the good life, and given our perceptions of the possibilities that we have to give shape to our 
                                                 
9 Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell comment that while this problem may be addressed by improving the models, “… in most cases 
we simply have to accept that there is a strong residual random component in human behaviour.”(2004: 22). 
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life. Such a view is much closer to Amartya Sen’s capability approach, which will be 
discussed in the following section. 
Of course, nothing has been said so far about measurability. It is surely possible that how 
well we feel, or how favourable we judge our overall situation to be, given our quality of life, 
is more amenable to measurement than trying to capture that quality itself. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to separate questions of measurability from the ontological question. What quality 
of life is, in so far this can be answered, is a prior problem that precedes the question of the 
best way of measuring it. Even if it turns out that we can only measure quality of life 
indirectly, for lack of access to the relevant data, we first have to develop a coherent 
conceptualisation, since otherwise we can’t tell what the best conceivable measures would be. 
Since we have just argued that quality of life is not the same as life satisfaction (however 
easy the latter may be to measure), we want to search for other ways to measure the quality of 
life within the capability approach. This will be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
2.2.5 Conclusion 
From the overview presented in this chapter we draw the following conclusions. Subjective 
well-being indicators, such as satisfaction in domains, or overall life satisfaction, give 
important insights in the experiences of well-being of the population (e.g the strongly 
decreasing subjective marginal contribution of income, and the different extent to which 
income and leisure time are positional goods). However, taken together, the four problems 
that we outlined above make the subjective approach less suitable as the basis for an index of 
life quality that is useful for policy purposes. But we certainly do not wish to deny that the 
approach which gives central stage to overall life satisfaction as the measure of life quality is 
a coherent one, and is based in a respectable tradition which moreover is developing rapidly 
in widely based research. We therefore recommend that measurements of life quality which 
are based on either of the two other approaches should be systematically compared to 
measures of reported life satisfaction, but without making the latter the decisive criterion of 
validation. 
2.3 The capability approach 
2.3.1 It’s about our possibilities to function 
The third theoretical framework for quality of life is the capability approach. It argues that the 
quality of life consists in the real opportunities of individuals to function in various areas of 
social life. The approach is relatively novel, but is connected to centuries-old theories about 
what makes life valuable. While its concepts are new, some of its core insights can be traced 
back to a number of intellectual traditions. To us, the capability approach has an intuitive 
appeal, because it gives a theoretical elaboration of how people experience their lives in 
practice on the basis of what they are able to do rather than how they feel. 
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The capability approach has been gradually developed by the economist and philosopher 
Amartya Sen (his first programmatic statement was the Tanner Lecture of 1979, published as 
Sen (1980)). Sen formulated the main theoretical concepts, and has illustrated their relevance 
with a number of simple empirical applications. In the last few years, Sen has added less new 
research to the capability approach, and the most prolific contributor has been the philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum. However, her version of the capability approach is predominantly 
philosophical, and the empirical part of her work is mainly based on narrative methods, 
which limits the relevance of her work for policy. In contrast to Sen, Nussbaum has not much 
to offer on the question how the capability approach can be translated into quantitative 
analyses or the production of statistics. 
 
2.3.2 Functionings, capabilities, and quality of life 
The two core concepts of the capability approach are functioning and capability. A capability 
is the real opportunity of a person to ‘be someone or do something’, in other words, the 
opportunities for flourishing that a person has. Examples are the capability to read, write, 
dance, being well-nourished, being healthy, even being happy, caring for others and being 
cared for, being able to work, being able to relax, and so forth. In principle, there are an 
unlimited number of capabilities. 
Capabilities are thus opportunities, not realisations or outcomes. The concept refers to the 
option set from among which a person can choose the option he or she wants to realise. Such 
a realised option Sen calls a functioning. For example, a decent childcare system can allow 
both parents to hold full-time jobs, or large part-time jobs, but it also allows parents to care 
for their children all by themselves. These parents have the capability to combine paid 
employment with care work, and the precise mix of functionings can be chosen by the parents 
themselves. 
Another important concept of the capability approach is the idea of conversion factors. These 
are factors that govern the conversion of resources into capabilities. Conversion factors take 
account of human diversity. Sen distinguishes three types of conversion factors: personal, 
social and environmental. Examples of personal conversion factors are physical handicaps: 
whether one possesses real options of moving around on one’s bicycle will much depend on 
one’s bodily ability to ride it. Hence a disabled person cannot convert this resource into the 
capability of mobility as efficiently as an able-bodied one can do. A different example of a 
social conversion factor is racism: in a society which discriminates against black people, a 
black person can be well trained and have all the necessary educational degrees, but can not 
use these resources to improve the quality of his life to the same extent as a white person with 
the same degrees and skills can do. An example of an environmental conversion factor is a 
rough climate, which may limit opportunities to perform agricultural activities on fertile soil. 
One could also distinguish institutional conversion factors, such as time-autonomy, the 
degree in which a person can allocate her time freely between different spheres of life. In 
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Chapter 3 we make use of this conversion factor when discussing how to operationalize the 
capability approach. 
How does the capability approach apply to research on quality of life? According to Sen, we 
should be concerned with people’s capabilities of functioning in various domains of life, 
while leaving it up to their own preferences and values which of these functionings they 
choose to realize, and which ones they would rather leave unused. In discussing the quality of 
life, one can make the same distinction between what is genuinely possible on the one hand, 
and what possibilities are in fact realized on the other: hence we can distinguish real 
accessible quality of life from realised or effective quality of life. Sen conceptualises real 
accessible quality of life in terms of a person’s capability set, and realised or effective quality 
of life in terms of the vector of (chosen) functionings that persons actually achieve.  
It obviously matters which of these two is taken as the relevant basis for life quality 
measurements in the context of public policy. From Sen’s perspective, capabilities are 
primary. In his view, the political goal is in principle the guarantee of real options, so that 
citizens can make their own choices regarding the levels of functioning they would wish to 
realize, given their own ideas about the good life. The two most important reasons for this 
stem from the liberal premises we discussed earlier: (1) the government is not mandated to 
decide how citizens should lead their lives, and (2) adults capable of acting should bear 
responsibility for their own lives, once fair shares of effective opportunities for reaching a 
good life are in place. As we have noted in 2.1, the resource approach uses these same 
premises to argue for a public conception of life quality that is strictly limited to the 
availability of all-purpose means, on the understanding that these are the only legitimate units 
of account for judging people’s opportunities to achieve the lives they wish to live. However, 
it was also seen that the capability approach criticises this liberal reluctance to specify the 
good life even in general, as a wrongly conceived retreat from ends to means. Sen’s concept 
of capabilities tries to make up for that supposed defect of the resource-based approach, by 
taking socially relevant functionings as the space on which to define real opportunities. Thus 
the claim that capabilities, rather than levels of achieved functioning should underlie public 
efforts to promote life quality is partly based upon these liberal reasons, but at the same time 
it must be based as well on the claim that opportunities for functioning constitute life quality 
independently of those reasons. Can this be shown? 
Listening to the experiences of people indeed gives some evidential indications that 
capabilities are a constitutive part of the quality of life. A recently published study by Ini 
Grewal and her colleagues confirms Sen’s claim that people themselves think about their own 
lives in terms of what they are able to do and to be. According to this qualitative research, the 
quality of life is about capabilities, and not so much about resources, happiness, satisfaction, 
or even about the degree to which one is effectively functioning (Grewal et al. 2006).10 This 
research team is currently setting up a further research project that aims at developing an 
                                                 
10 The description that follows is in part based on this published article, and in part on correspondence with Jo Coase (University of 
Birmingham). 
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index of the quality of life for the elderly in the UK, which does not limit itself to health 
indicators, as most other quality of life measures for the elderly do. In the first phase of this 
study, which consisted of in-depth interviews with elderly, it emerged that respondents 
themselves chose to describe their quality of life in terms of capabilities to function. This is 
an interesting observation, since the researchers had not started their project from a capability 
perspective, but rather were led into it by the findings of their interviews. Originally, their 
aim was to stay much closer to the methods and concepts of traditional health economics, but 
the responses of the elderly actually pushed their conceptualisation in the direction of the 
capability approach. The research of Grewal and her colleagues suggests that the elderly do 
not so much see their actual functioning as constituting their quality of life, but rather the real 
options they have to attain these functionings. In other words, it emerges that their 
capabilities, rather than their functionings are important. Frey and Stutzer’s (2005) research 
on the subjective well-being that Swiss citizens draw from the opportunities to democratic 
participation at the local level points to similar results. We return to this research below. 
 
2.3.3 Functionings or capabilities? 
In the previous section we gave two reasons why, according to the capability approach, 
inquiry into the quality of life should primarily focus on capabilities rather than on realised 
functionings. On the one hand there is Sen’s twofold normative argument that the 
government should not decide how people should live their lives, and that adults bear 
responsibility for their own lives. On the other hand there is the evidential argument from the 
study by Grewal and her colleagues that quality of life is experienced, at least in part, as a set 
of opportunities. 
However, there are good arguments not to focus exclusively on capabilities when 
conceptualising the quality of life. Fleurbaey (2006) argues that, while people do attach 
intrinsic importance to their opportunities to function in domains they value, one should not 
conclude from this that the functioning itself does not have any intrinsic value. It would 
indeed be very strange to think that people would highly value, for example, their 
opportunities to play in the theatre (hence value that capability), while at the same not being 
able to imagine that their life quality would be enhanced by actually playing a role on stage. 
Thus, if research reveals that capabilities are intrinsically valued, then that does not rule out 
that actual functionings are valuable as well, and might sometimes contribute more to life 
quality than having the capabilities do. This is important, since the twofold normative 
argument of Sen in favour of capabilities can be wrongly construed. According to Fleurbaey 
we should not simplistically interpret this liberal argument as the idea “… that taking account 
of freedom requires adopting the capability metric and dropping any concern for 
achievements” (2006: 308, our italics). We agree with this important remark. In addition, we 
want to point out that there are good reasons why the actual functioning of people in several 
domains may sometimes be taken as valid proxies of their capabilities, in an 
operationalization of the latter. In some cases, one could thus measure functionings, rather 
page 46 of 99 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) 
 
than trying to assess the whole set of functioning opportunities, which obviously is much 
more difficult to do. And sometimes it may be advisable try and to do both, as we shall see. 
In what follows we will give the most important arguments for this view, and we return to it 
in the next chapter. 
First of all, a focus on functionings can be justified when comparing inequalities between 
groups: if groups differ systematically in the level of achieved functionings, then one may 
conclude that the members of those groups did not have access to the same capabilities, 
unless there are plausible reasons why they would systematically choose differently 
(Robeyns, 2003). This is an example of how we can try to deduce information on capabilities 
from available information on functionings. A problem with this indirect method is that it 
does not account for the dispersion around mean group values, and may hence ignore 
individuals who have preferences and a lifestyle that does not match those of ‘their group’ 
(Cookson, 2005a: 820-821). The indirect method can therefore only be applied to some 
research questions, and is in any case a second-best solution. 
Secondly, measuring functionings is recommended for studies on the quality of life when 
having access to opportunities is arguably less relevant. For example, in the case of small 
children it is rather evident that one will want to focus on their actual functionings in 
assessing their quality of life, as Shelly Phipps (2002) has done in studies for Canada, 
Norway and the USA. The liberal principles that favour capabilities over functionings are not 
readily applicable to the case of small children. Small children do not always have a good 
overview over their options, and can in any case only bear limited responsibility for their own 
well-being. In addition it is rather clear what small children would need to reach a high 
quality of life. 
Thirdly, like other concepts of option sets or opportunity sets, capabilities are subject to 
several kinds of interdependencies. First, there are interdependencies between capability-
levels that follow from the decisions of an individual to allocate scarce resources over 
different domains. For instance, someone can invest his available resources, including time 
and money, to the domains of care, recreation, or alternatively to the domain of political 
participation. If the size of capabilities in these domains depends strongly on the same 
resources, then in many cases one can assume that the person chooses to allocate these 
resources in such a way as to realise the functionings that he or she wants to realise, after a 
process of deliberation. This implies that we could measure capabilities across rivalling 
domains, by measuring the functionings that are reached in each of those domains. As we 
will argue in Chapter 3, there are problems with this approach, but the phenomena of 
optimising the scarce resources that are shared by capability-domains is also an important 
reason to focus on functionings in the operationalization. An advantage of this method is that 
one is then focusing on the capabilities that people do in fact value most. 
A second kind of interdependency is given by the fact capabilities are to a significant degree 
determined by interactions between people. Again, this is true for other notions of option sets 
or opportunity sets. For example, each of two parents can separately have the opportunity to 
choose a demanding job that cannot be combined with minimal levels of care for their 
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children, but it may be impossible for both parents to do so. When measuring the capability 
of doing paid work in the domain of labour, we thus cannot simply add up all the options that 
are available in principle to someone with certain skills and credentials, but we need to 
distinguish between options of which the realisation depends on the behaviour of ‘significant 
others’ versus those where there is no such dependency. If the behaviour of others is within 
their legitimate domain of freedom, then the effectively realisable opportunities of individuals 
who stand in a relationship of mutual independence to some extent become indeterminate. 
This may also provide reasons for focusing directly on realised levels of functionings (Basu, 
1974; Basu and López-Calva, forthcoming).  
Finally, one could also try to solve the issue of choosing between functionings and 
capabilities in a conceptual manner, by measuring ‘refined functionings’ (Sen, 1987: 36-37; 
Fleurbaey, 2006). Refined functionings are functionings described in such a way that the 
possession of alternative opportunities is part of the being or doing itself, such as fasting, or 
choosing a part-time job over a fulltime one, rather than being given a part-time job. A 
similar way of bringing in choice options alongside achievements consists in not merely 
measuring realized functionings, but to include in the measure information about the 
opportunity of effectively making the choice to function in this way (Stewart, 1995; 
Fleurbaey, 2002). In the domain of labour, for example, measurement of capabilities for 
labour market participation could include data about the extent to which choice for a certain 
number of working hours is influenced by the absence or presence of certain conditions (such 
as childcare), the preferences of the employer, or the labour market position of one’s partner. 
A final and purely practical reason to measure functionings instead of capabilities has to do 
with the questions that one can sensibly include in a survey questionnaire. Questions aiming 
to collect data on capabilities rather than functionings will normally be longer and more 
difficultly worded, or one is forced to ask many questions in order to collect the necessary 
information for one capability. For example, in the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), 
respondents are not only asked if they are in fact going on holiday, buying new rather than 
second hand clothing, invite their family and friends once a month in their house (and so 
forth), but respondents answering ‘no’ are asked the additional question whether they would 
like to do so, but cannot afford these things.11 This twofold structure results in three 
categories of respondents: those who have realised the functioning, those who have not 
realised the functioning because they do not have the corresponding capability, and those 
who have not realised the functioning but did have the capability to do so if they wished. In 
short, research on capabilities will have to balance the risk of a lower response ratio due to 
unmanageable survey requirements against the theoretically motivated wish to collect as 
much information as possible about people’s opportunity sets, rather than just about the 
functionings they happen to achieve. 
                                                 
11 For applications of the capability approach based on the BHPS, and for discussions about the usefulness of the BHPS for such 
applications, see Anand (2005), Anand, Hunter and Schmidt (2005) and Robeyns (2006a).  
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We conclude that specific studies on domains of the quality of life in the literature are 
sometimes rightly focused on functionings rather than capabilities. For the reasons just listed, 
this is the case quite often. Nevertheless, there is no general rule that can be applied in all 
cases, and it will always be necessary to take a decision based on careful reasoning. We 
return to this question in Chapter 3, where more will be said about operationalization of 
capabilities. 
 
2.3.4 Which capabilities? 
The capability approach reaches out into many areas of life, so much may be clear. In the 
formulations so far thousands of relevant capabilities can be imagined. So if the quality of life 
is approached in terms of human capabilities, which capabilities should one then focus on? 
Being healthy? Being well-educated? Being safe? Being protected against wind, water, cold 
and heath? Being well-fed? For Veenhoven (2002a) the necessity to select among these 
dimensions is an important reason to reject ‘objective’ indicators: he argues that making such 
lists will only reflect the ‘delusions of the day’, and will therefore be unavoidably ideological. 
Before we proceed with this, it should be noted that the question how to select the relevant 
dimensions for assessing life quality is an issue for all multi-dimensional theories, 
irrespective of whether an individual’s quality of life is approached as a vector of available 
resources, or subjectively as a combination of reported satisfaction on different domains. A 
one-dimensional indicator such as Veenhoven’s life satisfaction does not face this problem, 
but as we noted in the previous section, overall life satisfaction is not particularly well-suited 
to develop or evaluate concrete policies. Moreover, the reliance on a one-dimensional 
indicator doesn’t make the overall version of the subjective approach any less problematic, 
since in the end every theory of the quality of life needs to give convincing arguments why its 
conceptualisation is the best available. 
Sen himself does not present a definite answer to the question which capabilities are relevant 
for the quality of life (Sen, 1993, 2004b; Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003, 2005b). There are 
two reasons for this. First of all, Sen has not presented the capability approach as a theory 
that specifically aims to assess the quality of life. Rather, it is a general framework that can 
be used for the conceptualisation of social justice, inequality measurement, the measurement 
of poverty, development policies, and so forth. In addition, Sen’s framework has a large 
reach. Capability research can be applied within a wide range of geographical and social 
situations, such as Alaska, Amsterdam or Sub-Saharan Africa. For such different worlds, Sen 
believes it makes no sense to propose only one single list of relevant capabilities. 
The second reason for Sen to leave open the list of capabilities is the importance of 
democratic processes when making judgements about the lives of people. He is opposed to 
letting the philosopher-king, or a group of guardians determine what is good for all; there has 
to be some scope for the affected parties to have their voices heard. For research on the 
quality of life, this means that scholars must be prepared to enter into dialogue with several 
groups in the society, and that no proposal concerning the content and substance of the 
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quality of life can have the last word. According to Sen, our views about what constitutes 
quality of life, and how we should understand that notion in a public context are thus made 
subject to a conversation process that is constantly open to revision. 
Nevertheless, philosophers and social scientists have actively pursued the question which 
capabilities are the relevant ones. Martha Nussbaum has spent more than a decade developing 
a list of capabilities. Her project is to develop the capability approach into a theory of the 
political foundations that each political constitution in the world should respect (Nussbaum, 
2000, 2003, 2006). Nussbaum defines capabilities more widely than Sen, and she especially 
highlights the talents, skills and internal capacities of human beings. One could say that while 
Sen focuses on the socio-economic aspects, Nussbaum stresses the psychological, emotional 
and aesthetic aspects of the quality of life. This may be explained by the fact that, while both 
are philosophers, Sen is also an economist, whereas Nussbaum is a scholar of the Classics, 
and thus inspired by classical works and literary studies of the emotions. To illustrate this 
contrast, here is Nussbaum’s most recent version of the list of capabilities (2006: 76-78): 
Nussbaum’s Central Human Capabilities 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, 
or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent 
assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual 
satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and 
reason—and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and cultivated by an 
adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical 
and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, 
musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of 
freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of 
religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial 
pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love 
those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to 
experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development 
blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human 
associations that can be shown to be crucial in their development). 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of 
conscience and religious observance.) 
page 50 of 99 Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) 
 
7. Affiliation.  
(A). Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of others. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and 
nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political 
speech.) 
(B). Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of non-
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national 
origin. 
8. Other species. Being able to life with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the 
world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over One’s Environment. 
(A). Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; 
having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association. 
(B). Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having 
property rights on an equal basis with others, having the right to seek employment on an 
equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, 
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reasons and entering into 
meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
 
Nussbaum’s list is intended to be a list of capabilities, not of realised functionings, as the 
‘being able to’ clauses show. In other words, she does not propose - as some of her critics 
wrongly argue - that every adult should be sexually active, but rather that every adult should 
be allowed and empowered to have this opportunity. For Nussbaum the good life entails that 
threshold levels of the capabilities on her list are provided for all human beings. Hence, for a 
good life it is important that we are not subjected to bodily violence, but if someone chooses 
to be a boxer, then this person should be free, according to Nussbaum, to enter the ring. 
Although Nussbaum does not want to force anyone into actual functionings but rather deals 
with people’s capabilities, her project has nevertheless received quite some criticism. The 
critiques are not just about the precise items on the list, but also express concern that this list 
resembles the Platonistic project of the philosopher-king. Nussbaum argues that her list has 
been developed by listening to people in several cultures and countries, and that the list is 
constantly open for revision. But in the meantime it remains her own list all the same, of 
which she argues that minimal levels should be provide as a constitutional right by all 
governments to their citizens. Some of Nussbaum’s critics find this attitude paternalistic, 
undemocratic, or even politically illegitimate (Menon, 2002; Robeyns, 2005b). Other authors 
who have tried to define quality of life in terms of capabilities have therefore suggested 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP) page 51 of 99 
 
methods for deciding how to select capabilities, and explicitly discussed the question of who 
should be entitled to take part in this selection (Alkire, 2002; Robeyns, 2003, 2005b). This 
literature shows that so far, different attempts have been made to identify the relevant 
capabilities that together constitute a person’s quality of life, but that there is no unanimity on 
how this selection should be done, and which capabilities should ultimately be included. 
One could select the relevant capabilities by using a procedure that aims to minimise the risk 
of incurring epistemological and ideological biases (Robeyns, 2003, 2005b). The general goal 
is to make the selection procedure as neutral and open as possible. The criteria are the 
following: 
Explicit formulation and debate: the list of dimensions needs to be made explicit, defended, 
and debated 
Methodological justification: the method used to derive the list has to be explained and 
defended. 
Sensitivity to context: the list needs to be drawn up at the level of abstraction appropriate for 
the goals it serves, and formulated in the language of the debate it enters. 
Distinguishing between different levels of generality: if the selection of dimensions aims at an 
empirical application, or aims to lead to implementable policy proposals, then the list needs 
to be drawn up in two phases. The first phase involves the drawing up of a kind of ideal list, 
whereas in the second phase pragmatic considerations come into the picture. Constraints such 
as measurability, availability of data, or political considerations should only enter in the 
second phase, since these constraints can change over time, and experience shows that 
otherwise existing biases in the collected data will be reproduced. 
Exhaustion and non-reduction: the list of dimensions should include all possibly important 
dimensions, and these should not be reducible to each other. For example, non-market 
activities which contribute to the quality of life are sometimes left out, for reasons that are 
related to the development of economic science. This kind of bias caused by neglect should 
also be avoided. 
These are exacting criteria, but one simple expedient is to start with a brainstorming session, 
to do a literature review of all (academic and non-academic) relevant literature, to consult 
other relevant lists, and to open the draft list for discussion and debate (Robeyns, 2003: 72-
74). For some researchers this may appear to be a self-evident method, but many existing 
empirical applications of the capability approach, and also other approaches that use 
‘objective lists’, are based on ad hoc lists of dimensions, with little attention being paid to the 
justification of the selected dimensions. 
 
2.3.5 Evaluation of the capability approach 
Is the capability approach a good candidate for conceptualising and measuring the quality of 
life? At this stage, it is too early to be sure, since there are only a limited number of 
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applications. However, based on ontological and conceptual grounds, there are certain aspects 
of this approach that, in our view, give it some strong advantages. 
First of all, the capability approach captures well what the quality of life is: it is what we are 
effectively able to do and to be, and how we can concrete give shape to our life. From an 
ontological point of view, the selected functionings and capabilities correspond to the quality 
of life of people, if care has been taken to make the selection process of capabilities sensitive 
to context in the way described above. We are not the only ones expressing this point of 
view. The German Ministry of Health and Social Security has used the capability approach as 
the theoretical foundation of its second report on poverty and affluence (Bundesministerium 
für Gesundheit und Soziale Sicherung, 2005). The earlier mentioned study by Grewal and her 
colleagues (2006) also lends some support to our ontological claim. 
Secondly, the multi-dimensional character of the capability approach reflects the diversity of 
the quality of life. It may happen that quality improves in one area of a person’s life, but 
worsens in another area. Multi-dimensional concepts can study these partial aspects of life 
quality independently. 
Thirdly, once a list of capabilities has been drawn up, the capability approach is 
predominantly objective. This makes it possible to avoid the problems of mental adaptation to 
which the subjective approach is vulnerable. Policies aimed at improving the sustainable life 
quality of a population need to focus on the capabilities of this generation, without 
jeopardizing the potential for future generations to attain capabilities. Even if it were known 
that future generations would somehow be able to derive the same satisfaction from lesser 
capabilities, this should not be a valid ground for relaxing intergenerational requirements of 
sustainability. Contrary to the utilitarian position, we think it is not the main task of 
government to make people happy, but rather to organise society in such a way that its 
citizens are offered valuable real opportunities to give shape to their own lives. The 
government then needs to focus on objective dimensions, for if promoting subjective well-
being is the overarching policy criterion, then people or groups with a ‘shiny disposition’ – 
the so-called efficient converters of opportunities into utility – would often end up being 
disadvantaged in their real opportunities. 
These arguments do not entail that the capability approach wants to do away with subjective 
indicators entirely. If we study certain aspects of the quality of life, for example time pressure 
arising from competing desires to function effectively in different areas, then we do need to 
ask our respondents how they evaluate their situation subjectively, but we also need to collect 
precise objective information. Take the example of safety in urban environments. Subjective 
judgements about ‘safety on the street’ often do not correspond to the real risks of certain 
groups of people to become a victim of violent attacks. The Dutch Social and Cultural 
Planning office (SCP) reported that while objective measures showed that the rate of criminal 
offences on the street decreased, subjective feelings of unease and fear among the population 
regarding safety issues rose in the same period. If we only take this subjective information 
into account, we would get a distorted picture. This is not to say that the subjective judgement 
is unimportant, for it is certainly useful to know that the population is more concerned about 
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safety issues, even if the real threat of incurring violence is in fact diminishing. The 
appropriate reaction would be to highlight the discrepancy, inform the public about the 
objective tendencies, and investigate why people in general, and some groups in particular, 
are feeling less safe.12 In conclusion: if subjective and objective indicators give conflicting 
information, we have to take notice and try to understand the discrepancy. But in a capability-
based index of the quality of life we have to give priority to objective indicators. As we will 
discuss in Chapter 3, however, the capability approach can take subjective information into 
account when constructing individual weighting factors for functioning-levels in different 
domains. 
 
2.4 Towards a capability-index 
 
We want to complete our survey of the three approaches to quality of life with a synthesis of 
how they relate to each other. Figure 2.1 presents the causal relations between the three 
approaches. 
 
  
 --choice-- functionings  
resources 
 
capabilities
   
subjective 
well-being 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The direction of causal relations between resources, capabilities, and subjective well-being. 
 
The resource-based approach holds that the ‘quality of life’ is what people do with their 
resources. Questions about the content of the quality of life are not considered to be a 
legitimate task of the government, which needs to be neutral between the divergent views that 
people have about the good life. The government needs to restrict its care to guaranteeing 
access to collective resources and to regulate entitlements to individual resources, and it 
ought not to impose its own views about the appropriate use of those resources. 
The capability approach holds that resources are important inputs for the quality of life, but 
that the quality of life itself is captured by the functionings and capabilities of individuals. In 
contrast to liberalism, which doesn’t want to go beyond identifying resources that can be used 
for a wide range of goals, the capability approach argues that a debate about the general and 
                                                 
12 For example, it may be the case that an increase of reported levels of crime is creating the impression among the public that the 
number of actual criminal offences is increasing. See Wittebrood and Nieuwbeerta (2006) for an analysis of the last 25 years in the 
Netherlands. 
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specific opportunities to shape our lives surely lies within the legitimate domain of the 
government. The subjective well-being approach agrees with the view that resources are 
means for multiple goals, but in addition holds that the only neutral indicator for judging how 
well people fare in their achievement of those goals, is their life satisfaction, either overall 
(Veenhoven) or additionally in specific domains of life (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell). 
This is why the subjective well-being situates quality of life at the righthand end of the causal 
scheme of figure 2.1. Thus the subjective approach holds that it is the government’s duty to 
advance ‘happiness’ or ‘life-satisfaction’, even though not all variants endorse giving an 
absolute priority to the utilitarian master principle of maximizing average life satisfaction. 
Against this, the capability approach argues, on ontological grounds, that subjective well-
being cannot be regarded as the ultimate measure of the quality of life, but should rather be 
seen as a (undoubtedly desirable) by-product. In the scheme in figure 2.1, capabilities and 
functionings, but also subjective well-being, are presented as outputs of the all-purpose 
means at the resource end. However, there are two differences. First of all, capabilities and 
functionings are outputs that can be intersubjectively identified only within a given society, in 
open discussion. We should debate and discuss their relevance, for the notion of life quality is 
not - at least not in our view, which follows Sen rather than Nussbaum - interculturally and 
universally determinable by philosophical reflection. By contrast, happiness, life satisfaction, 
or satisfaction on domains, are purely subjective outputs of persons’ resource utilisations.13 
However, secondly, in so far as life satisfaction issues from the way in which people 
experience their opportunities to function, and their actual functioning levels, it is also a 
causal output of functionings and capabilities. For as figure 2.1 shows, functionings and 
capabilities are situated as intermediating between resources and subjective well-being. 
Next, it is important to note that capabilities - the real opportunities to function effectively - 
can have a strong effect on life satisfaction, independently of the satisfaction that people 
derive from their actual functioning. Even the secure knowledge that certain opportunities are 
open to persons can have a positive effect on their happiness. For example, many inhabitants 
of cities with significant national heritage or cultural centres appreciate the possibilities to 
enjoy these cultural and historical goods, even if they are leading a secluded life and never 
actually do visit these sites. Another example can be found in the domain of political rights. 
Frey and Stutzer (2005) show that the opportunities for direct political participation in Swiss 
villages and cities has a positive effect on life satisfaction, independently of the level of 
actual participation. This is another illustration of the upper part of the causal scheme in 
figure 2.1, whereby the (Swiss) formal democratic rights at the local level figures as the 
resource, the availability of which contributes to people’s opportunities to participate in the 
collective decision process of their local community. The presence of these capabilities 
subsequently produces subjective well-being, quite apart from the choices that citizens 
actually make to divide their time over political participation and other activities that generate 
                                                 
13 We reject the causal scheme that was presented in Hagerty et al. (2001: 79-81) as a theoretical instrument which should be used 
for all quality of life indexes, since that scheme does not offer us the appropriate space to include functionings and capabilities, and 
it also does not allow us to recognize that functionings and capabilities are also outputs.  
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life satisfaction. The capability approach thus allows that causal relations between resources 
and subjective well-being follow different chains. Thus, even if one ultimately prefers a 
subjective approach to the quality of life, it may still be important to examine functionings 
and capabilities, as is in fact being done in some of the literature. A similar observation holds 
for those who prefer the resource-based approach to life quality. For as we have discussed in 
2.1, it is by no means immediately evident what types of resources are actually required for 
people to realize their own and diverse conceptions of the good life. In order to argue why, 
for example, civil rights or cultural heritage need to be included among the relevant all-
purpose means in a list of vital resources for the quality of life, empirical research concerning 
the well-being actually generated by those resources is indispensable. And in such research, 
focusing on functionings and capabilities as direct consequences of resource use would 
certainly be a good way of proceeding. 
In this Chapter we have examined the three approaches in terms of how they conceptualise 
the quality of life and to what extent they are suitable as a theoretical foundation for a policy-
relevant measure of the quality of life. The synthetic overview in Figure 2.1 above shows that 
the three approaches are closely related, since capabilities and functionings need resources as 
inputs, and ultimately generate subjective well-being. A choice for one of the three 
approaches is therefore a choice to locate the quality of life in a particular part of this causal 
chain. If one favours the capability approach, then quality of life is considered as the 
intermediate stage in the trajectory from resources to subjective well-being, or, as the 
political philosopher Gerald Cohen has phrased it, as the “midfare derived from resources, 
rather than preferences satisfaction or welfare” (Cohen, 1993). 
If we consider all advantages and disadvantages of the different approaches that were 
discussed in this chapter, our conclusion is that on theoretical grounds the capability 
approach is to be preferred as the foundation for a measure of the quality of life. However, it 
must be kept firmly in mind that the empirical development of the capability approach is still 
in an early stage. It is possible that further research will reveal disadvantages of a capability-
based life quality-index that are insufficiently appreciated at present. Given the limited brief 
of this study, we cannot attempt to carry the empirical programme implied by the capabilty 
approach all the way. Thus we cannot present a full construction of a capability-index, for as 
we will show in the following Chapter, this involves a lot of hard and detailed work. Rather, 
our aim is to provide the foundations for such a project of index-construction. 
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3 Towards a capability-index of the quality of life 
 
 
In the previous Chapter we argued at length that good theoretical and conceptual reasons 
exist for choosing a capability approach when developing an index of the quality of life for 
public purposes. This Chapter discusses three foundational issues in the construction of such 
an index. In the first section (3.1) we study the selection of domains, and offer a tentative 
proposal on which domains should be included in an overall measure of life quality. Section 
(3.2) introduces some novel theoretical concepts that can be used in the construction of 
capability measures. In the last section (3.3) we focus on the weighting problems that arise if 
one wants to aggregate a multidimensional concept ranging over a number of domains into a 
single index figure. 
3.1 The list of domains 
 
In selecting domains, we start from the existing literature of the capability approach, and ask 
what we can learn concerning the general characteristics of the index that we envisage. Next 
we propose a tentative list of domains, and discuss how it relates to other existing lists. 
Finally we take stock of the steps that are needed for further operationalization. These are 
then developed in section 3.2 of this chapter. 
 
3.1.1 What can we learn from the literature? 
The literature on the capability approach evolves rapidly: a survey written today may be 
outdated in six months from now. A recent survey of empirical applications shows that at 
present, no scholar even has worked out the theoretical foundations of a capability-index of 
life quality, let alone engaged in the work of operationalizing and testing empirically such a 
quality index (Robeyns, 2006b). Thus in the prevailing state of the art, developing a 
capability-index is a pioneering task. Nevertheless, current literature does offer two important 
insights. 
The first insight is that we need to distinguish between the design of an index based on 
existing secondary statistics, versus an index constructed against a background of sufficient 
time and resources to collect most of the data on the capability-domains. Existing empirical 
applications are strongly determined by the available datasets, both with respect to the 
selection of capabilities, as well as the possibilities to measure capabilities rather than levels 
of realised functionings. Almost all these applications work with datasets constructed with 
other purposes in mind. This is a disadvantage. If we are limited by available datasets, then it 
is likely that we will remain far removed from an adequate capability-index of life quality. 
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Since in this chapter we are primarily interested in a conceptual exploration, we assume that 
there are no constraints on the data that can be gathered. 
Another insight from the existing literature concerns the character of the index itself: at what 
level of abstraction and aggregation would one like to construct an index? We can illustrate 
this question by the work of Ini Grewal and her co-authors, which was discussed in the 
previous chapter (Grewal et al., 2006). Recall that this British research group is developing 
an index of the quality of life for the elderly in the UK. Grewal and her colleagues based the 
selection of capabilities entirely on information received from the elderly themselves. In the 
interviews, they were asked to state their life-experiences, and how they evaluate their lives 
based on those experiences. This information was then used to deduce constitutive domains 
of life quality (called ‘attributes of the quality of life’). The researchers try to identify 
domains that do not overlap, and cover as many as possible experiences of the elderly. The 
five domains that Grewal and her colleagues propose are attachment, role, enjoyment, 
security and control. 
Notice that the experiences of the elderly are here classified at a high level of abstraction. 
This may perhaps be justifiable, if it is clear that findings from the five domains will be used 
for policies specifically aimed at provisions for the elderly. But is this high a level of 
abstraction desirable and workable if one is concerned with an index for the entire 
population, which should be relevant for a wide range of policy domains? In their survey 
article on indexes of the quality of life for policy purposes, Hagerty and his co-authors (2001: 
2) argue that one of the criteria an index should meet is that it be useful for policy design and 
evaluation. That is also the explicit goal of our study. A capability-index which seeks to 
inform governmental policies should be formulated at a lower level of abstraction than the 
five very general dimensions worked out by Grewal et al. We believe that it is preferable to 
select concrete social areas of capabilities to function, rather than abstract aspects of 
functioning, such as the social roles or the experiences of enjoyment, security or control. For 
such aspects are bound to have a different significance in each of those social areas, and 
moreover, a category such as ‘social role’ may not be entirely understandable to the 
respondents themselves. Thus it is important to think carefully about the level of abstraction 
at which one would like to develop an index. This also applies in a somewhat different way to 
Martha Nussbaum’s well-known list, which we discussed in the previous chapter. Again the 
capability-domains of Nussbaum’s list are formulated at a rather high level of abstraction, 
and correspond to a different goal than ours. They are primarily useful for a philosophical 
analysis of transcultural justice and constitutional foundations. Note also that a more detailed 
examination of Nussbaum’s list shows that it includes a number of capabilities that are hardly 
within the scope of governmental influence - or arguably beyond it, for example the 
capability of ‘emotions’. 
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3.1.2 The domains: a first attempt 
In this section we propose a list of capabilities in a range of domains that we believe should 
be included in a policy-relevant index of life quality. Our method corresponds to the steps of 
the selection process described in the previous chapter, but we limit ourselves here to the first 
step of literature research. We derive the domains from the literature on indicators of the 
quality of life, together with the literature on the capability approach. For the first we use the 
large overview of quality of life indexes (Hagerty et al., 2001) and for the second the recent 
survey article on applications of the capability approach (Robeyns, 2006b). This allows us to 
draw up a provisional list of capabilities for the quality of life. For each domain discussed in 
the two survey articles we posed three questions: 
1. Does this domain contribute unequivocally to the quality of life, if the domain is 
conceptualised in terms of capability? 
2. Does a low score on this domain refer clearly to a lower quality of life of the person, 
if all other factors are held constant? 
3. Are the capabilities clearly within the legitimate domain of the government? 
We present the list of domains that emerged from this process in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1: domains for a capability-index: a first attempt 
1. physical health 
2. mental health 
3. knowledge and intellectual development 
4. labour 
5. care 
6. social relations 
7. recreation 
8. shelter 
9. living-environment 
10. mobility 
11. security 
12. non-discrimination and respect for diversity 
13. political participation 
 
What are the practical implications of this selection? Our aim is that scores on these 13 
domains of the list should together give a reasonable impression of the quality of life of 
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inhabitants of the Netherlands, which could be used as goals for governmental policies. In 
other words, this ‘quality of life’ is constituted by the real opportunities that inhabitants of the 
Netherlands have to function in each of these 13 domains. Domains 1 and 2, physical and 
mental health, are the most personal domains of functioning. Domains 3 to 8 are societal 
domains, whereas 9 to 13 are largely determined by the political institutions (even though in 
the case of domain 12, non-discrimination and respect for diversity, the dominant culture 
plays an important role). 
To start with the obvious, physical and mental health are generally regarded as core aspects 
of the quality of life. The justification of separating physical and mental health is somewhat 
more difficult. We believe it may be justifiable to aggregate all dimensions of health, 
‘physical’ as well as ‘mental’ in one single domain. Nevertheless, in the first instance we 
would suggest the possibility to keep them separate, since the social valuation of physical and 
mental health is rather different. It would take us too far to elaborate this point here at length, 
but we refer to Layard’s work, where he argues that in Western societies relatively little 
attention is being paid to taking care of mental health problems which nevertheless cause 
significant declines in subjective well-being (Layard, 2005: chapter 13). 
The capability knowledge and intellectual development as a domain of the quality of life 
requires some explanation, since without doubt there are people who have little or no interest 
in developing their knowledge and intellectual faculties. It is perfectly legitimate and quite 
understandable if someone remains indifferent to understanding advanced algebra, or 
mastering foreign languages such as French or Russian. But making it possible that people 
with talents for mathematics or languages have the effective opportunity to study, generates a 
positive contribution to the quality of life, even of those who do not wish to use these 
opportunities. It is not difficult to see the policy link: this capability is supported by a range 
of public policies, including the support of high-quality education, the advancement of the 
arts and the sciences, the development and maintenance of a network of public libraries, and 
so forth. (Of course, supporting this capability does not imply that all such support should be 
provided for free; the exact distribution of the costs is analytically a separate question). 
While it is possible to understand work as a source of income, the opportunity to perform 
labour is a constitutive aspect of the quality of life: people want to be put into a position to 
use and develop their talents, to feel useful, and to perform decent, challenging and 
meaningful work. It is possible that people living in a radically different culture, or in 
societies hundreds or thousands of years in the past or the future thought or will think 
differently about this. But in the Netherlands at the beginning of the present century, it is 
certainly the case that the opportunity to perform meaningful work is an important aspect of 
the quality of life. This does not rule out that a large number of people choose not to do (paid) 
work, for example because they study full-time, or because they have significant caring 
responsibilities, or because they are undertaking other kinds of projects. But even for these 
people the opportunity to paid labour is extremely valuable. What are the implications for 
governmental policies? The government can facilitate this capability by removing social 
obstacles, such as by giving citizens incentives for education and the development of skills, 
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by actively combating labour market discrimination, by removing unnecessary bureaucratic 
obstacles, by supporting the work-life balance, and by developing an active labour market 
policy that creates jobs rather than destroying them (see Schokkaert and Van Ootegem, 1990; 
Gallie in Esping-Andersen, ed., 2002). 
Similarly, the opportunity to provide care, whether for children, the elderly, ill partners or 
family members, or others, is an important part of the quality of life. The government can 
play a role to support this capability too, for example by allowing employees to temporarily 
leave the labour market without losing their job and (part of) their income. This is in fact one 
of the goals of the Dutch lifecycle-arrangement (levensloopregeling), and it is further 
facilitated by care and parental leave in the Netherlands, and a range of measures in the other 
Western societies. 
Another important aspect of life quality is to develop and maintain social relations. This is 
primarily a responsibility of people themselves, but nevertheless the government can play a 
facilitating role, for example by subsidising activities organised by neighbourhood 
committees that have a positive effect on social cohesion in an area, or by reserving public 
space for parks or playgrounds with places for the young and the elderly to meet. Obviously 
the issue is not just to provide these public goods, but to attend to their quality: public spaces 
have to be well-designed and maintained to invite people to use them in order to meet others 
in safety and comfort. Similarly, social relations in households and families can be fostered 
by the government, for example by supporting full-time carers of the ill, disabled and the 
elderly, or by making het Consultatiebureau14 as accessible as possible, and staffed with 
high-quality professionals, so that its advice and services will be of real use to families who 
face problems with children’s health or their upbringing. Again, quality of life is about real 
opportunities and not just about the levels of actual functioning: someone who has ample 
options to engage in valuable social relationships, but who wants to lead a solitary life, does 
not necessarily have a lower quality of life than someone who is part of a large and happy 
family. Social isolation thus needs to be evaluated differently when it is enforced by 
circumstances rather than being freely chosen. 
Recreational activities are not just valuable functionings, but generally enjoyable as well: the 
opportunities to develop these activities are therefore also part of the quality of life. The 
government can facilitate this capability, for example by guaranteeing that every employee is 
legally entitled to a sufficient number of days off (something which is currently not the case 
in all countries), or by protecting nature for recreational activities. 
The quality of one’s shelter is a part of the quality of life that is widely recognized to be 
relevant for government policies. People’s quality of life increases if they can live in a nice 
and cosy house, with sufficient light and if they are not faced with problems such as damp or 
dust, which in turn provoke negative emotions and may cause health problems. We 
                                                 
14 Het consultatiebureau is a Dutch public institution which checks the health of mothers of newborns and their children, provides 
vaccinations, and gives information and advise to parents on a range of issues related to caring for and raising children. The British 
equivalent are the Health Visitors which are part of the NHS’s Primary Care Team.  
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distinguish shelter from the living environment. In the latter case we are concerned about 
being able to live with clean air, water and surfaces, free of dangerous substances and heavy 
traffic. One could also include dimensions that relate to the good maintenance of the 
environmental infrastructure. 
A rather different element of the quality of life is non-discrimination and respect for 
diversity. It concerns the functioning in a social environment which is free of discrimination 
resulting from disrespect of human diversity related to religion, sexual orientation, race, 
language, gender, lifestyle, etc. Even if this might seem to be a self-evident capability, it is 
crucial for people’s well-being. This capability will be especially valued by people who have 
experienced discrimination themselves, or within their immediate circles. They will regard 
the absence of discrimination as an important part of their quality of life. The government can 
enhance this capability with legal and constitutional tools, for example by establishing and 
supporting a Commission for Equal Opportunities and Non-Discrimination, and by not 
reinforcing stereotypes on which discrimination is based by unnecessarily stigmatising 
particular demographic groups. 
Mobility is also an important capability: people want to have the opportunity to move from 
place to place, without losing too much time on congested roads or being faced with poor 
service in public transport. The role for the government is clear: to develop and maintain a 
network of roads that enables this mobility, to develop policies that prevent queues (for 
example, by introducing systems of electronic pricing for cars, if such systems are effective), 
and by the exploitation or regulation of public transport. Similar observations can be made 
for security, since the large majority of the Dutch population experience the protection of 
their valuables, including the absence of physical violence, as a part of their quality of life. 
The final capability that we propose is the opportunity for political participation. In section 
2.4 we pointed at a study by Frey and Stutzer (2005), who showed that the rights to political 
participation by Swiss citizens have a positive effect on their life-satisfaction, independent of 
whether they are using these rights. Even if only a limited share of the population becomes 
active in political organisations and societal debates, many people would protest if they no 
longer had the opportunity to such participation. The general tendency on a global scale is 
that people prefer democratic over non-democratic regimes. Citizens value their opportunities 
for political participation and influence on political decision making. 
 
3.1.3 Comparison with other lists 
Each proposal for a list of capabilities needs to be justified according to the selection 
procedure explained in the previous chapter. Here we can obviously not follow this 
procedure. We can only seek to confront our tentative list with other lists that have emerged 
from the literature. This will allow us to further explain why certain capabilities are included 
or excluded. 
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First of all, let us compare the above 13 domains with the selections made for the 22 rather 
different quality of life indices which have been analysed by Hagerty and colleagues (2001). 
Some lists discussed in this detailed overview contain a number of domains that do not fit 
into a capability approach of life quality for individuals, such as aggregate per capita income, 
per capita industrial production, or indicators reflecting the current state of scientific and 
technological knowledge. Other dimensions are subjective indicators (satisfaction or 
happiness). We explained earlier why we do not include such dimensions, even if this does 
prevent us from acknowledging that the subjective well-being measures which correlate with 
scores on functionings or capabilities can be part of a study within the capability approach. A 
third type of dimensions in the overview of 22 indices are metrics of the distribution of 
opportunities and means, such as poverty indices, inequality measures and rates of social 
mobility. Such domains are generally meant to capture the quality of life in an entire society. 
They are less appropriate as part of a quality index at individual level. As we argued in 
Chapter 1, there are good reasons not to include distributional measures as constitutive parts 
of individual life quality (section 1.4). 
The Hagerty overview also discusses the Living Conditions Index (LCI) which has been 
developed by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office (SCP) from 1974 onwards 
(Boelhouwer, 2002a, 2000b, 2005a, 2005b; Boelhouwer and Stoop, 1998, see 
www.scp.nl/english). We single out this index for a brief discussion here, summarizing a 
more detailed treatment in Annexe B of the original report. The initial goal of the LCI was to 
construct an index which would represent for the social side of life in the Netherlands what 
GDP per capita represents for economic life. The index does not give absolute values, but 
allows one to chart trends in the index and its components over time. The LCI is not built on 
an overarching theoretical foundation. It is said to be loosely related to both the capability 
approach and an approach focusing on societal opportunities based on the supply and 
distribution of resources (Boelhouwer 2005a: 297). The domains included in the current LCI 
are listed in Table 3.2 below, together with the social indicators making up each domain. 
 
Table 3.2: the Living Conditions Index 
Domains and indicators of the SCP Living Conditions Index: 
1. Health Being hampered when 
- performing daily activities 
- recreational activities, sport, travelling. 
2. Housing 
 
 
Type of building 
Area of living room 
Number of rooms 
House owned or not 
Scare spot in the neighbourhood 
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3. Purchasing power/consumer durables Number of household appliances 
Number of hobby articles 
4. Mobility Car Ownership 
Season ticket for public transport 
5. Leisure activities Number of hobbies. 
Number of non-domestic entertainment 
activities. 
Organisational membership. 
6. Social participation Active contribution to activities of 
organisation. 
Volunteer work. 
Social isolation. 
7. Sports activity Number of times sporting a week. 
Number of sports. 
8. Holiday Holiday trip in the last year. 
Holiday trip abroad. 
Durable holiday articles. 
Source: SCP (1998: 81); Boelhouwer (2002b: 96-97; 2005b). 
 
The aggregation of the different indicators listed in this table proceeds in two steps. First, the 
eight domains are identified by using a statistical data-reduction procedure, as representing 
clusters of indicators which are sufficiently closely associated to form a latent dimension. The 
weights of each indicator are then determined by the extent to which they correlate with the 
latent dimension. In effect, this dimension receives a substantive interpretation, by giving it 
the name of the domain in question, on the basis of the content of the indicators. For example, 
the three indicators of domain 6 turn out to hang together closely enough to regard the latent 
dimension which emerges from the data-reduction procedure as the ‘domain of social 
participation’. This method thus rules out that a set of indicators which does not display such 
a close association in the data will come to belong to one and the same domain, even if there 
might be substantive reasons for regarding each of these indicators as distinct aspects of 
quality within a given area of social life. The second stage of aggregation is to give equal 
weights to the different domain-clusters of indicators, irrespectively of the number of 
indicators forming a given cluster (Boelhouwer, 2002a: 129). In section 3.3 we shall briefly 
comment on this procedure. 
The LCI-index is to some extent compatible with a capability-based index of the quality of 
life. We note only a few points of difference here. Our list of capabilities does not distinguish 
between different kinds of recreational activities and possibilities, in contrast to the 
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dimensions of the LCI. We do not deny that it can be important to distinguish these for policy 
goals, but we believe that the LCI-dimensions leisure activities, sport, and holidays, can be 
seen as dimensions of the domain of recreation, whereas social participation is a dimension 
that falls within our domain of social relations. In addition, the SCP discusses the means for 
good living conditions, such as income, education and employment. Rather than regarding 
these last two as inputs of ‘living conditions’, they may also reflect past functionings within 
capability-options which arguably constitute quality of life. But we admit that whether 
indicators of ‘education’ or ‘employment’ are regarded as capability-supporting resources, or 
are fitted into the capability framework will depend a lot on how they are measured.15 A 
similar point applies to health, which in the SCP-index mainly figures as the absence of 
physical barriers. Health and employment are part of our list since we believe that the 
opportunity to function in those domains is not limited to its instrumental value, but also 
carries intrinsic value. Moreover, we also want to make a distinction between the mental and 
physical aspects of health.  
As we explain in more detail below, it will be important in the operationalization of the 
domains to clearly distinguish how the intrinsic and instrumental aspects of the quality of life 
are related to capabilities and realised functionings. Especially in the case of health, 
knowledge and employment, the instrumental aspects of effective functioning have 
implications over the entire range of domains. It may therefore be useful to ask respondents 
about the degree in which they have effective access to decent and useful employment (the 
opportunities to hold such employment are intrinsically valuable), but also to register the 
degree to which a person is de facto employed at a certain functionings- and earningslevel 
(since this gives us information about her future options in the domain of employment as well 
as in other domains). Whether one chooses to do so depends on a number of specific 
considerations which will be discussed below. 
Finally, we would like to mention two domains that have been proposed in the literature that 
do invite further discussion: independence and time-autonomy. Independence, conceived as a 
general kind of personal sovereignty was included in the study by Grewal and her colleagues 
under the name of ‘control’ (2006). We have chosen not to include this domain for the 
following reasons. Firstly, it is possible to have a high quality of life without being strongly 
                                                 
15 Note added to this English translation: We would like to respond to Boelhower’s astute comments on the Dutch version of our 
report, which is included in the version published on the MNP website, together with our reply. Boelhouwer is right to point out that 
the logical structure of the capability approach sometimes makes it difficult to judge the extent to which a given item is to be 
counted as a either a ‘resource’ or a ‘capability’, or possibly as both. Our criterion for including an item in a list of valuable 
functionings or opportunities to function is that such value must be intrinsic, not merely instrumental for other purposes. For 
example, one can assess someone’s net income, without inquiring into its source. In that case, one is surely measuring in the space 
of resources. However, if we assess someone’s income from work, then the size of that income may also be held to indicate the 
person’s capability to provide resources. In market economies, having this capability is arguably desirable in itself, quite apart from 
the goods and services which the income can actually buy. It may therefore be defensible to consider including earnings from work 
as a proxy measure of this particular capability in the domain of labour, as a dimension distinct from the more familiar measures of 
life quality in work, such as degree of autonomy in performing tasks, having a private work space and so on. It should also be noted 
that these quality indicators in the domain of labour need not invariably correlate highly enough to make up a single latent 
dimension. In the LCI methodology, this would be a problem. But as will be argued below in section 3.3, we do not think that it is 
necessary to aggregate quality indicators into domains by this method.  
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independent: a paralysed person bound to a wheelchair is dependent on others to be mobile, 
but if there are others available to guarantee mobility whenever the disabled wants to go 
someplace, then that lack of independence may not have a direct negative influence on her 
quality of life (her disability does, of course). Secondly, independence is at a higher level of 
abstraction than the domains we propose. Thirdly, it is not clear whether independence 
properly belongs in a policy-relevant index of the quality of life, since it is not clear to what 
extent the government can influence this domain, except for guaranteeing fundamental 
democratic and civil rights.  
In contrast to the list proposed by Robeyns (2003) for the empirical evaluation of gender 
inequality in western societies, our list does not include the domain of ‘time-autonomy’. This 
raises the question whether we should include the abstract capability to allocate one’s time as 
one sees fit as part of a capability index. We will return to this question below, after we have 
first discussed what else is needed for further processes of operationalization and 
measurement. 
 
3.1.4 Further elaboration 
Merely presenting a list of capabilities is still far removed from a full operationalization, let 
alone a useful measurement tool. How do we have to interpret this list, and what else is 
needed for the further development of a capability-index of the quality of life? Further 
research might develop according to the following sequence of stages. 
The first stage is to make the list robust and perhaps refine and modify it, through further 
discussion and debate, and further empirical research. As we discussed in section 2.3, the 
selection of relevant capabilities should be based on quantitative empirical research, 
complemented with in-depth interviews, focus groups, and other qualitative methods. Even if 
research on capabilities and the quality of life is in its infancy, nevertheless the available 
empirical studies in this field allow us to conclude that such methods are practically feasible, 
can lead to interesting insights, and can prevent possible biases in the selection process (e.g. 
Biggeri et al., 2006; Grewal et al., 2006; Wolff and de-Shalit, 2007). Within the scope of the 
present study it is impossible to follow this procedure. Therefore our selection of capabilities 
has to be understood as open and tentative, as a first step on the way to a more in-depth 
analysis. 
Once there is a consensus on a workable list of capabilities, the next stage is to determine the 
dimensions for each of the domains, and the indicators for each of the dimensions. Again it is 
beyond the scope of the present study to take this step, but we will indicate how such a 
process may unfold. For each domain there exists a body of research in which scientists have 
studied the quality of life in a variety of ways. In these specialised fields a lot of work can be 
found that can clarify which indicators are appropriate and useful within a capability-index of 
life quality. For example, for the domain ‘labour’ one can turn to national labour studies to 
find indicators, and also to the department of statistics of the International Labour 
Organisation. We believe that the selection of one or more dimensions for each of the 
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capability domains on the list requires close cooperation with specialists from different fields 
of research, since a lot of knowledge already exists that is useful for developing a capability-
index. However, we also believe that this should be a cooperative effort rather than 
commissioned research, since otherwise there is a significant risk that the index will become 
less coherent. If the goal is to develop a genuine capability-index of the quality of life, then it 
is important that the different parts of the index are integrated by scholars who are well-
versed in the theoretical niceties of this approach, and can take responsibility for the ‘final 
editing’ of the index. 
The third stage of further research concerns the formulation of survey questionnaires, where 
the contribution of social scientists who specialize in survey design is essential. Below we 
provide some preliminary thoughts on the kind of information we need to collect via these 
questionnaires. In the fourth and final phase, pilot studies should be conducted to test the 
questionnaires, and to refine the instrument before it can be effectively used in large scale 
data collection. 
3.2 Conceptual choices in operationalizing capability domains 
 
In this section some theoretical notions appear on stage that may be useful when 
operationalizing the capabilities in separate domains. First we introduce the notion of a 
capability input mapping (3.2.1) and two related notions, competing capabilities and limited 
capability inputs (3.2.2). Next we elaborate on the issue of time –since this is the most limited 
capability input– and discuss the role of time autonomy in the capability approach (3.2.3). 
Referring back to what has been said in 2.3.3, we also discuss one of the most important 
problems in operationalizing the capability approach, the question of whether one should 
measure a capability as a set of functioning opportunities, or rather as a realised functioning 
level which is indicative for that set, or perhaps a combination of both (3.2.4). Finally (in 
3.2.5) we summarize a more specific proposal for operationalizing the 13 domains. 
 
3.2.1 The capability input mapping 
A capability input mapping is the set of factors that enable the development or maintenance 
of capabilities on each of the domains of the list. These capability inputs can be seen as 
resources, as broadly described in Chapter 2. However, we need to take into account that 
reaching a certain level of functioning in some domains (think of the domains of knowledge 
or labour) may also be among the factors that enable a person to develop or maintain certain 
capabilities in other domains, or even in the same domain. At this point we will ignore this 
dynamic complication, but we return to it briefly in 3.2.4. In addition, the theoretical 
literature of the capability approach also stresses the importance of conversion factors in a 
capability input mapping. These are indirect capability inputs, being defined as factors which 
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facilitate or hamper the conversion of resources into capabilities. We postpone the discussion 
of conversion factors until 3.2.3. 
The tentative illustration provided in Table 3.3 below thus discusses the mapping of resources 
onto capabilities. For each domain on the list, we ask what the most important resources are, 
and group these in the last two columns of the table as inputs over which the government can 
exert control, or which are largely beyond its control.  
 
Table 3.3: Example of a capability input mapping (resources) 
Capability Capability-inputs under the 
control of government  
Capability-inputs beyond 
the control of government 
1. physical health Time. 
Money. 
Natural environment. 
Health care.… 
Role in society (for example, 
employment or care). 
Innate physical health.… 
2. mental health Role in society (for example, 
employment or care). 
Health care. 
Social relations.… 
Innate mental health. 
Education and care within the 
family. 
… 
3. knowledge and intellectual 
development 
Education and culture. 
Media. 
Time. 
Money.… 
Innate intellectual talents. 
Upbringing. 
… 
4. labour Time. 
Labour market policies. 
Social capital. 
… 
Knowledge and skills. 
Innate talents. 
Social class in which one is 
born. 
Social network.… 
5. care Time. 
Money. 
Public care services.… 
Social norms. 
Size of families and 
households. 
… 
6. social relations Time.Money. 
Social capital.… 
 
Family and social class in 
which one is born.… 
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7. recreation Time. 
Money. 
Employment conditions. 
Sport and cultural policies.… 
Population density. 
… 
8. shelter Housing policies. 
Traffic infrastructure. 
Money (wealth). 
Financial conditions for 
housing (rental policies, 
mortgages, …).… 
Spatial-geographic limitations. 
Average size of households. 
 
9. living-environment Environmental policies. 
Spatial planning.… 
External influences on the 
environment.… 
10. mobility Time. 
Traffic infrastructure. 
Money.… 
Population density. 
Mobility needs of others. 
… 
11. security Police and legal order. 
Characteristics of spatial 
planning. 
Social capital.… 
Social norms. 
Reporting in the media. 
… 
12. non-discrimination and 
respect for diversity 
Legislation respecting human 
diversity. 
Image of minorities as 
depicted by the government. 
Education.… 
Dominant public morals. 
Small-scale civil society 
projects. 
Social norms. 
Images created by the 
media.… 
13. political participation Time. 
Structure of political 
organisations. 
Media. 
Social capital.… 
The constitution and the 
fundamental legal order of the 
Netherlands and the European 
Union.… 
 
This example of a capability input mapping is by no means as precise as is needed for a 
detailed application of the tool. A more precise mapping requires a separate study of the 
determinants of each capability, which we cannot provide here. But the example does draw 
attention to two important issues. First, a well-executed input mapping can take stock of 
capabilities that can be strongly influenced by the government, versus those that can only be 
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influenced to a very limited extent (or not at all). This is important when the aim is not only 
to conceptualise and measure the quality of life, but to develop governmental policies that 
will improve the quality of life in these domains as well. The input mapping tells us 
something about how ‘malleable’ the quality of life within domains is, and which policy 
instruments might be appropriate. Secondly, the input mapping clarifies how the capability 
approach and the approach that relies on a broad definition of resources are related. As we 
mentioned earlier, among the capability inputs are not just resources, but also factors that 
influence the conversion of resources into capabilities. The government can exert influence 
on some of these conversion factors, as we will show below. 
To illustrate with a hypothetical example, the importance of the resource inputs for 
supporting capability in a domain is denoted by asterisks. Suppose that after a studying the 
domain of non-discrimination and respect for diversity we have the following mapping: 
 
Table 3.4: most important inputs for domain 12 (an example) 
12. Non-discrimination 
and respect for diversity 
Legislation respecting human 
diversity** 
Enforcement of the law, in hiring 
policies, and in the public 
communication of government 
agencies*** 
Education* 
Dominant public morals* 
Small-scale civil society 
projects** 
Social manners. 
Images created by the media* 
 
In case this would be the correct capability input mapping, items with no asterisk or only one 
asterisk indicate the areas where government has only limited possibilities to promote that 
capability, depending on its degree of control. The government can make sure that its 
legislation is in tune with the constitution, and enforce its laws, but it cannot easily prevent 
the media from spreading discriminatory content which judges would consider within the 
provisions of the law and protected under free speech. It can certainly combat discrimination 
against its own employees, and give good examples by not communicating negative images 
of minorities through its own agencies, and it can also try to prevent such images from being 
reinforced within education programs. In addition, the government could try to financially 
support small-scale civil society projects and not frustrate their emergence by unnecessary 
bureaucratic hurdles. But whether such projects succeed, will be largely up to the members of 
civil society itself.  
Even the sketchy capability input mapping of Table 3.3 shows that time and money are 
important resources. This has important consequences for the status of the domain of labour, 
since performing labour is time-intensive and generates income. Almost all capabilities have 
money as a necessary resource. For many people labour is the only means to command 
sufficient amounts of money which can be allocated to different capability domains, in 
addition to their wealth, and their financial entitlements from the welfare state. But the work 
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needed to generate this income usually does claim a large share of available time. The 
domain of labour therefore is pivotal for shaping quality of life, since a person’s functioning 
in this domain is related to important decisions to allocate resources to capabilities in other 
domains. Those decisions are largely the responsibility of individuals and households. 
However, a government which wants to advance the quality of life of its citizens will have to 
carefully consider its labour market policies. 
When posing the question to what extent the government can control capability inputs, it is 
useful to distinguish public provisions from policies that affect the availability of time and 
money. Public provisions obviously impose costs in time and money through the tax system, 
but the benefits are targeted on specific domains through a great number of policy 
instruments. In contrast, policies that aim to affect the available amounts of time and money 
of citizens – policies related to labour market participation, employment, productivity-
improvements and the redistribution of primary and secondary income – are much more 
general. These policies touch upon all domains in which citizens make trade-offs between 
time and money, within the options that have been shaped by public provisions. In this study 
we cannot even begin to discuss all these general policy interventions. By way of example, 
we focus on the question to what extent the government can redistribute time and money. 
As far as money is concerned, the most straightforward instrument is the fiscal regime: 
through taxes and subsidies the government influences the post-tax income distribution. In 
addition, the government also influences the pre-tax income distribution, for example by 
policies which shape the opportunities to generate income. A society which heavily 
subsidizes education, and in which adult education programs are well developed in particular, 
will strongly support people to generate a decent income. In various ways government can 
also provide incentives to firms for hiring workers rather than substituting labour by capital. 
In some countries the government has a strong influence on the wage level through collective 
agreements on employment conditions, and in this way it also indirectly affects income 
distribution between people who derive income primarily from labour and people whose 
income comes from profits or interest. 
Next, the input of disposable time can also be redistributed by the government in a number of 
direct and indirect ways. An example is the Belgian system of time credits. A time credit 
allows employees to temporarily interrupt their employment either fulltime or part-time, with 
a guarantee that one will be able to return to one’s employment after the period of leave. The 
government pays a compensation for forgone income.16 In addition employees are entitled to 
so-called ‘thematic leaves’: paid leave in case one cares for a child under the age of 6, or care 
leave for family members with illnesses. In the Netherlands, the ‘lifecycle policy’ has 
recently been introduced, which also subsidizes the net cost of shifting labour time to unpaid 
activities of households, even though the subsidy it provided is lower than in the Belgian time 
credit system. Other countries, especially Scandinavian ones, have even more generous 
                                                 
16 see http://meta.fgov.be/pc/pce/pcet/nlcet11.htm 
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systems for employees who are under severe time pressure, generally due to the burden of 
caring duties at the peak of their working age careers (Gornick and Meyers 2003). Clearly, a 
detailed evaluation of the impact of such policies on the capability sets of different groups of 
citizens requires very close analysis. The only point we wish to make is that the existence of 
these policies demonstrates that governments are perfectly capable of shaping the distribution 
of time and money between different demographic groups, if reasons for doing so exist. And 
some of those reasons may be to improve the quality of life. 
Nevertheless, governments have only limited means of controlling the allocation of time and 
money across different capabilities by individuals and households themselves. Policy 
instruments do influence the allocation between individuals and households, for example 
those aiming to limit social inequality of capability inputs. But how particular citizens decide 
to allocate their time, efforts and money among capability domains is not the business of 
government, at least not on the principle that government should be as neutral as possible 
between different notions of the good life. However, a government may in some cases decide 
to interfere in personal allocations in order to safeguard the continuity of individual 
capabilities, as we discuss in 3.2.4. 
In what follows next we build on the capability input mapping. We draw attention to the fact 
that some capability domains are closely related through the common resources they require. 
These so-called competing domains are of interest for the question of assessing capabilities 
through functioning measurements. We also return to the role of conversion factors in the 
input mapping. 
 
3.2.2 Competing capabilities for limited inputs 
As noted, a well-designed capability input mapping provides an overview of the capability-
dimensions in the domains of our list that compete for the same resources. ‘Competing 
capabilities’ thus share inputs which may be invested in producing one or the other capability 
in different proportions, time and money are the most obvious examples. Resources that are 
not shared in this way, or only to a limited extent, are more like public goods. For example: 
the domains of mobility and non-discrimination are not competing. Improved mobility can be 
achieved without jeopardizing the capability of non-discrimination and respect, since public 
inputs in these domains are hardly competing at the level of the government budget, and also 
because legislation which aims to rule out discrimination resembles a pure collective good. In 
contrast, labour and care are strongly competing capabilities: a parent may work fulltime and 
decide to care a limited number of hours for her child, or she may work part-time and care 
part-time, or work little or not at all but invest a lot of time and attention in bringing up the 
child. Each of us has only 24 hours in a day: it is therefore impossible to maximise all those 
capabilities of which time is an important input. 
The degree to which capabilities are competing is not only influenced by the degree in which 
its realisation depends on one or more rivalling inputs, but also by the question whether these 
inputs are ‘strongly or weakly limited’. Time is the most strongly limited capability input: we 
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can spend our waking time on caring, labour, recreation, moving around, engaging in social 
contacts, and participating in politics. Each hour spent in performing one activity cannot be 
spent on another, unless one gives up on the time needed for sleep and personal maintenance. 
Other capability inputs are less limited: income is of course scarce for most people, but we 
can to some extent expand our capabilities by working for higher pay, borrowing money or 
receiving a financial gift. A third group of capability inputs is not limited at all: these are 
important or necessary inputs for certain capabilities, but their use does not decrease the 
possibility to realise other capabilities. Emotional intelligence is a capability input for labour, 
care, social relations (affiliation), and also for some forms of recreation. But applying one’s 
emotional intelligence in paid labour does not imply that less of this intelligence is left for 
friendships or voluntary work. 
Of course many capabilities are competing in various ways to varying extents. But there are 
few capabilities that do not require time or money for their realisation. Thus some capabilities 
are clearly strongly competing, such as the earlier mentioned example of caring activities, 
paid labour, and recreational activities. Others are weakly competing with capabilities in other 
domains, such as security (including being safeguarded against sexual and domestic violence 
and violence on the street). By designing a capability input mapping, we can acquire more 
information on the degrees to which these domains are competing and thus require allocation 
decisions for their realization. 
 
3.2.3 Time and time-autonomy 
The capability input of disposable time invites analysis of the relation between (1) the 
selection of capability domains, and (2) the choice of indicators which represent functionings 
or represent capabilities. First we want to look at the question that was raised in 3.1.3, namely 
whether time-autonomy should be included as an independent domain. This issue will be seen 
to relate to another question on our agenda regarding the choice between functionings, 
capabilities or both, to which we return shortly. 
Time-autonomy is a part of the analysis of strongly competing capabilities – opportunities to 
function that depend to a large extent on the absolutely limited input of disposable time and 
the strongly limited input of money. It is important to distinguish between strongly and 
weakly competing capabilities, for the simple reason that strongly competing capabilities are 
co-realisable only to a limited extent. As we have pointed out, this is the case with 
capabilities listed among the domains of labour, care, recreational activities and mobility, but 
also for some other dimensions such as those of social relations and political participation.17 
                                                 
17 Many social relations require ‘networking’ and long-term maintenance. Political participation in a representative democracy 
requires, apart from gathering information, rather little time for those who do not want to be a member of a political party, or who 
are not active in a social movement or activist group. Those citizens only need to go out and vote after they have informed 
themselves about political issues. But as Max Weber already made clear, Politik als Beruf is surely one of the most time-consuming 
social roles. Robert Dahl has pointed at the fundamental importance of limited time for the organisation of a democratic regime 
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For example, if someone has no caring duties and has access to independent means of 
income, then this person can work fulltime, undertake leisure activities fulltime, engage in 
caring activities (as a volunteer) fulltime, or any combination of those activities. Now when 
this person is asked in a survey whether she has the possibility to work fulltime, she will 
respond “yes”; if we ask her whether she could be engaged in leisure activities if she would 
like so, she would again say “yes”; and so on. But it is clear that she cannot do everything at 
the same time, and that her financial budget also poses limits.  
As a consequence, with strongly competing capabilities it becomes necessary to investigate 
the entire set of these capabilities in assessing quality of life, and not to evaluate the 
opportunities in each of the domains separately, since this would give us a misleading idea of 
the person’s real opportunities as a whole. The extent to which a person has available 
opportunities to function in strongly competing domains at any given point in time therefore 
depends on the way this person allocates her time among the functionings she wishes to 
achieve in each of them. If we want to gain an insight in the overall opportunities in the set of 
strongly competing domains, then we should in fact consider it as one large domain. Just as a 
person can choose to achieve one particular way of functioning in one domain while 
foregoing other functionings in that same domain (say recreating by performing a sport rather 
than playing music) a person can also choose to expand certain functionings in one domain at 
the expense of opportunities in another – strongly competing – domain. 
This line of inquiry suggests that strongly competing capabilities could be measured simply 
by assessing the available common inputs. One may be tempted to think that knowing how 
much money and time a person has at her disposal is enough to determine what her 
opportunities are over strongly competing domains. However, if we work within a capability 
framework, we should not just measure inputs. In the capability approach, these are inputs of 
carefully selected capabilities, and not inputs for just any kind of ‘good life’. But there is yet 
another reason why the resources of time and money should not be seen as decisive for the 
quality of someone’s life in strongly competing domains, even if these inputs give us a good 
impression of the maximal opportunities of the individual to function. That reason is the 
freedom to allocate time and money usually is limited to a grater or lesser extent - and the 
limitations of this freedom are especially salient in the case of time. 
This brings us to the argument advanced in Robeyns (2003) to include the autonomy that a 
person has to allocate her disposable time as an abstract capability. The idea is that the 
freedom to allocate time according to one’s own insights is both an intrinsically valuable part 
of the quality of life – to be a person of ‘independent means’ traditionally denotes the 
capability of being able to spend one’s time as one pleases - as well as being instrumentally 
valuable. The instrumental value of this freedom is that one can realise one’s own notion of 
the good by allocating one’s time to those activities that one actually deems worth pursuing, 
and to be able to take time off for rest or simply for doing nothing at all. Both aspects of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Dahl, 2000: 105-114) and for the inequalities in political power and influence which emerge as the consequence of differences in 
political participation (Dahl, 2006: chapter 5)..  
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freedom to control one’s own time are part of the good life of citizens in a democratic 
society. But even though civil and political rights formally support time-autonomy, the 
necessity to earn a living within the institutions of the existing economic system imposes a 
number of binding constraints, and thus limits the temporal autonomy of most of us in 
practice. Time as a resource becomes more valuable the less the use of that time is subjected 
to constraints. This could be a reason to include time as an abstract capability in a list 
designed for assessing quality of life. Following Goodin (2001), Van der Veen and Groot 
(2006) have tried to measure to what extent different types of welfare states promote the 
time-autonomy of its citizens. Their research shows that the Netherlands in the 1990s 
performs well in this area, and there are indications that this is still the case. Similar research 
has been undertaken by Burgoon and Baxandall (2005). 
However, we do not want to include time-autonomy as a domain since we think that the 
capability domains on our list should include areas of social life that are easily recognisable 
to citizens, and which can be directly influenced by the policy instruments. Moreover, there is 
another way to take account of the undeniable importance of time-autonomy, which 
highlights its instrumental value. Earlier we mentioned that there are two types of capability 
inputs: resources on the one hand, and conversion factors which facilitate or hamper the 
transformation of resources into capabilities. One could conceptualise time-autonomy as an 
institutional (and partly social) conversion factor, in particular a factor which facilitates the 
individual allocation of resources over strongly competing capability domains. 
An example may clarify, and also illustrate the role that the government has to play here. The 
Netherlands was one of the first countries where part-time workers enjoy the same rights as 
full time workers pro rato. From an international perspective this is surely not a self-evident 
arrangement: for in the USA a number of important social rights (in particular health care 
insurance) are only offered to full time workers – and even not to all of them. Those who 
prefer to work 20 rather than 40 hours a week will then pay a high price in terms of the risk 
coverage they are giving up. The same may be the case for work-related benefits, such as 
pension-savings. Thus, in the Netherlands public policies regarding part-time work have 
improved the time autonomy of citizens. Other provisions, such as care-leaves or parental 
leaves, or the employee rights to flexibility in choosing working hours, are elements 
influencing people’s time-autonomy. 
One way to do justice to the importance of time-autonomy is by including it in a capability 
input mapping as a conversion factor. This would in any case allow us to take into account 
the instrumental factors of time-autonomy when designing public policies regarding the 
quality of life. Yet again there will be limits to what a government can do in this respect. In 
2.3.3 we noted that the degree to which a person in fact has opportunities of freely choosing 
among a range of functionings is not only constrained by institutional factors, but also by 
interactions within households. Parents generally decide together how to divide the caring 
responsibilities for their children, and adult children jointly decide who will care for their 
dependent parents. Thus at the micro-level, the willingness and preferences of other members 
of the household have a direct influence on the capabilities of an individual person. Again the 
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degree of time-autonomy plays a crucial role, since it can tell us something about the person’s 
entire capability-set, rather than only about the maximum achievable scores on each of the 
capabilities taken separately. To get more information, detailed time budget studies are 
needed (cfr. Gershuny 2000). But government has little control over (legally acceptable) 
behavioural patterns that influence the division of time within the household. 
 
3.2.4 Opportunities or effective functioning? 
In 2.3.3 we discussed the reasons why one might want to measure capabilities, achieved 
functionings, or a combination of both. At the most general level, capabilities are probably 
preferred, since they do not impose a specific notion of the good life, and allow us to take 
into account personal responsibility for how one uses one’s capabilities. On the other hand, 
we do not only value our opportunities to function, but also what we actually ‘are and do’, by 
making choices among those opportunities. The question whether in applied capability 
research we should focus on capabilities or functionings should be decided for each 
application separately. For each application different theoretical arguments may be relevant. 
Also each application has its own pragmatic considerations - such as acceptable 
simplifications in view of collectible data, policy relevance, empirical constraints, reducing 
the costs of research, and so forth. 
We want to analyse this important question somewhat further here. In 2.3.3 it was noted that 
for some capabilities, the realised functioning level can be taken to indicate the maximum 
level of the capability (Robeyns, 2003). This is the case for functionings where it makes 
sense to assume that everyone would try to realise them as extensively as possible. Another 
consideration in favour of measuring functionings rather than capabilities is related to 
personal responsibility, for we have seen that part of the liberal argument for preferring 
capabilities in a policy-relevant life quality assessment was that people can be held 
responsible for how they choose to utilize their ‘fair shares’ of capabilities. However, 
judgements on whether or not someone carries responsibility for his own behaviour may 
require too much empirical information. Alternatively, it may be decided from a normative 
point of view that the responsibility issue should play no role in assessing someone’s well-
being in a certain area. Health may be an example where both of these considerations are 
relevant: virtually everyone wants to be healthy. Yet not everyone acts to preserve their 
health. It is often hard to know in the case of an illness or impairment to what extent this is 
caused by behaviour for which one can be held responsible for bad health, morally or legally. 
And in any case, medical ethics militates against making the allocation of health care too 
sensitive to responsible behaviour: even the notoriously irresponsible are entitled to at least 
some treatment on the principle of need. Thus, if the capabilities for which these reasons hold 
are not strongly competing ones, then it may be that collecting information regarding the 
levels of individual functioning is sufficient for assessing their quality of life. 
Another independent argument in favour of functionings can be constructed for strongly 
competing capabilities. As already mentioned in 2.3.3, the basic idea is that if someone is 
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able to allocate scarce inputs between different domains according to his own views – which 
requires a large degree of time-autonomy – then one may assume he will choose to allocate 
these inputs optimally, in line with his preferences. As a consequence, in domains where he 
prefers to reach a high level of functioning, he will invest to enlarge the corresponding 
capability up to that level at the expense of capabilities in other domains, in which his 
preferred level of functioning is lower. This idea of optimising provides an argument for 
taking the vector of realised functionings as a measure of the person’s entire capability set of 
competing domains, unless there are clear indications that his time-autonomy is strongly 
constrained, so that he is not in fact able to optimise. In the latter case it may become 
necessary to investigate to what extent people allocate their time differently from what they 
would prefer. One could do this by making use of existing research regarding time allocation. 
One could then decide to apply a correction, to discount the degree of time-autonomy in the 
scores of the realised functionings in strongly competing domains. 
Yet a third consideration for measuring levels of functionings however argues in part against 
the idea that ceteris paribus people are better off if they have more time-autonomy. This 
consideration builds on the fact that some capabilities are not only dependent on resources, 
but also on previously realised capabilities in the same domain, or in other domains. In the 
mapping of Table 3.2 we did not include these causal relations, in order to keep the table 
simple, but they should not be overlooked. For example, as noted before, it is almost 
impossible to function on the Dutch labour market without possessing a minimum level of 
education. In our society there is almost no work one can do if one does not know how to 
read, write, and make basic calculations: even domestic cleaners need to be able to read the 
information on cleaning products, or to be able to read the notes left by their employers on 
the kitchen table. Similarly, to function well as a citizen one needs a number of basic skills, 
such as being able to communicate with governmental agencies, health care providers, or 
teachers. Therefore one may decide to include a minimum level of functioning for the 
dimension of schooling in the domain of knowledge and intellectual development, since 
reaching such level is crucial for capabilities in several domains and its lack strongly 
constraints people’s opportunities. 
A similar argument can of course be made for the domain of labour. Labour as a capability is 
generally threatened if one does not use one’s capability of performing paid work regularly. 
Someone who chooses not to participate on the labour market for a long time will lose 
earning power, and face reduced chances for meaningful and well-paid work in the future, 
just as much as someone who is non-active due to involuntary unemployment. This may be a 
reason why in a survey, one should not only focus on the options that someone has to perform 
paid work of different kinds and remunerations, but also whether the person has effectively 
held a job for a certain period (for example in the last 5 years). 
So there may be good reasons why a metric of the quality of life should include the 
measurement of minimum levels of activities that are deemed essential, in addition to 
measures of capabilities. It is important to note, though, that this proposal is to some extent 
based on a paternalistic consideration which goes against the importance of time-autonomy. 
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But a certain degree of paternalism in assessing life quality within the domains of education 
and labour may be acceptable, if it is clear that these minimum levels of functioning are truly 
indispensable for maintaining one’s capabilities in the near future. If it is decided to include 
such minimum levels in the index of the quality of life, then this reflects that the quality of 
life of a person should meet some minimum conditions of personal sustainability at each 
point in time.18 
 
3.2.5 Towards a capability-index 
We have introduced a range of conceptual tools which may be of help when operationalizing 
the diverse capability-domains in each of the 13 domains. The underlying thought was that a 
good operationalization takes into account the different relations between different domains, 
using the capability input mapping. Once this is done, it will be easier to justify the various 
choices that are needed for a further operationalization of capabilities in specific domains, 
and in particular to judge in which cases it is advisable to measure functioning levels rather 
than engaging in the difficult job of assessing entire sets of opportunities. But is it possible to 
be somewhat more specific about what a capability index of life quality of life would look 
like? Starting from our selection of capabilities as presented in 3.1, and accepting the 
arguments presented above in 3.2.4, we may decide to choose indicators for the 13 domains 
as follows: 
Security and non-discrimination and respect for diversity can be measured at the level of 
functionings, since we do not see any good reasons why people would choose to function 
below the maximum attainable level. 
Mental and physical health are more difficult, since there may be a political debate regarding 
to what extent the government wants to hold people responsible for their health, or for certain 
aspects of their health. If the government believes that this responsibility cannot be left to 
individuals, for example due to the large influence of innate factors that one does not control, 
or due to a strong correlation of health achievement with social class, then these are reasons 
to measure these domains as realised functionings, and not as capabilities. 
Knowledge and intellectual development should be measured as a combination of 
functionings at a minimum level (certainly for education), and as capabilities for the higher 
levels. As discussed, the same may be decided for the domain of labour. 
                                                 
18 This view is analytically distinct from the view that sustainability demands at the level of the entire society should enter into the 
metric of quality of life, a view that we have rejected in Chapter 1.4. If one claims, for example, that an increase in labour market 
participation in the Netherlands is an essential condition for the sustainability of the health care system in the next 25 years, then a 
certain average level of labour market participation can be regarded as being part of the sustainability goal listed under cell (1) in 
Table 2.1. However, we would not want to claim that a society that does not meet this condition at present would, for this reason, 
have a lower quality of life. But it is possible to argue consistently with this last position - that the life quality of a given individual 
will in fact be lowered when he or she does not achieve a certain minimum level of functioning in the domain of labour, when it can 
be shown that this deficit diminishes his or her capability to function in other domains after only a short time lag. 
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Shelter, living-environment, and mobility can be analysed as weakly competing capabilities. 
However, one should take into account willingness to pay the tax costs of public resources 
that support those capabilities in order to judge how important they are to people. In the next 
section we say more about this. 
Social relations, labour, care and recreational activities are strongly competing on the input 
of time and therefore need to be analysed as a ‘competing capability-set’. For the 
measurement of individual levels of this capability set the vector of realised functionings in 
those domains is a decent approximation. Note, however, that we have argued that 
corrections may need to be made for individuals whose time-autonomy is significantly 
constrained. The design of such correction factors has to take into account the discrepancies 
between the time one would like to spend in a particular domain, and the time effectively 
spent in that domain. 
For the domain of political participation, formal rights of participation are non-competing 
capabilities, and these are equal for all citizens (but not fully shared by residents). But the 
time-intensive capability dimensions of participating in political organisations are different 
from these formal rights. They should be added to the competing capability set. 
We stress, once again, that this is only a sketch of how one could proceed in operationalizing 
the capability approach to quality of life. A more complete proposal for operationalizing 
capabilities demands much more detailed research on the separate domains, after an in-depth 
study of the relevant input mappings. Our sketch gives only a first guide in case it would be 
decided to further develop the capability approach up to the level of a complete set of 
indicators. The analysis of 3.1 and 3.2 illustrated that a full development of a capability-based 
index of life quality is a large project indeed. We hope that this analysis has illuminated the 
steps that are needed for a responsible and justifiable selection and operationalization of 
capability domains. In the following section we present some suggestions that may be useful 
for the weighting of the indicators, and for assessing the relative weight of capability-
domains in an index. 
 
3.3 Weighting problems in aggregating capability scores 
3.3.1 The issue of aggregation 
The need for an aggregate capability-index of life quality only arises when it is desirable to 
catch the quality of life of an individual, a group, or the entire population in one single 
summary figure. As mentioned in the Introduction (1.1) and in 1.3, having such a summary 
index may indeed be desirable. It contributes to the political saliency of the (inherently 
multidimensional) capability approach, because it enables comparison with established 
indices that seek to measure life quality either by the direct route of overall happiness and life 
satisfaction, or in indirectly, in terms of resources such as BNP per capita, or the Human 
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Development Index of the UNDP. The issue of how to weight individual scores, or some 
group statistic of such scores, across the different capabilities which contribute to life quality 
thus needs to be clarified. That issue also presents itself when a government is interested in 
trading off attainable levels of life quality across dimensions or domains in a framework of 
public policy. From a democratic point of view, it must then assess how people actually value 
different aspects of their life quality. A different viewpoint for determining the relative 
weight in ‘overall life quality’ of specific capabilities, or domains of capabilities, assesses the 
extent to which achieving a high standard of life quality in various areas may interfere with 
sustainability constraints of the kind that were discussed in 1.2. In the next chapter we come 
back to both of these points of interest, in the context of the research undertaken in the 
Sustainability Outlook. 
Any aggregation towards a summary measure inevitably involves loss of information. In the 
present approach this is especially the case, since any given capability is measured by 
possibly more than one single indicator, and several capabilities may be included in one of 
the selected domains. Thus there are several levels of aggregation to be considered before an 
overall index of life quality can be constructed. In this chapter we only provide a rough 
outline of key issues that arise along the way. 
3.3.2 From indicators to dimensions, from dimensions to domains 
In principle a capability-domain, such as mobility, is comprised of several dimensions. In the 
SCP Living Conditions Index for example, private transport by cars and public transport are 
two such dimensions. Dimensions are distinguished on theoretical grounds – for instance the 
degree of available freedom for an individual differs across the above two dimensions – but 
also on policy-related grounds. Public transport and car traffic each require different public 
inputs, and the choice to promote a combination of these two can have economic and 
distributive effects which government may wish to take into account. 
Once it is known which theoretical dimensions of life quality are to be included in a domain, 
and why they need to be distinguished from one another (this will also depend on how 
ambitious one wants to be in measuring quality of life) each of these dimensions needs to be 
operationalized by selecting the proper indicators. Often the theoretical concept underlying a 
given capability-dimension will be captured by several indicators, which then need to be 
summarized in some way informed by statistical data theory. For example, based on the 
correlations between different indicators, techniques of data-reduction such as factor analysis 
can be used. In this phase one may need explorative research on a number of indicators that 
are present in several datasets to construct acceptable measures for quality of life on each 
dimension in a given domain. One then might find that previous theoretical decisions (such as 
were discussed in 3.2.4) to operationalize capabilities either in terms of opportunity-sets or in 
terms of achieved functionings will have to be adapted or reconsidered. 
In general the issue of weighting indicators to obtain a measure of a capability-dimension can 
be treated as an empirical task of (statistical) data-construction. This should be distinguished 
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from the further question of how several dimensions are to be aggregated into a summary 
index for a domain of capabilities.  
In 3.1.3 we noted that the LCI-index actually uses statistical data-reduction to construct entire 
domains of ‘living conditions’. But we doubt that it is a sensible idea to require that a domain 
of capability-dimensions should be reducible to one single latent dimension at a higher level, 
since there is no obvious reason why the scores on those dimensions should closely hang 
together. For example one might want to include the dimension of being able to move freely 
without bodily pain, alongside the dimension of respiratory capacity in the domain of 
physical health, but there is no reason why we should require a strong correlation between 
scores on these dimensions as a condition for placing them in that domain, as the LCI-method 
does require.  
How to arrive at a useful domain-index, then, will depend on specific conceptual, normative 
and also policy-oriented requirements. This applies even more to the next level of 
aggregation, when one is working towards a single unifying figure that expresses the quality 
of life in a sub-group of the thirteen domains distinguished in 3.1, or ultimately in all of them. 
In the remainder of this section we shall concentrate on this highest level of aggregation, but 
some of the issues to be discussed surely also present themselves at the level of domains. 
 
3.3.3 Equal weighting of domains in a reference-index 
The pragmatic starting point of index-construction is straightforward: give all variables that 
need to be weighted an equal weight, and only deviate from this default if good reasons to do 
so exist. The equally weighted index then serves as the reference-index. It is the standard for 
comparing any indices in which variables receive unequal weights for whatever reasons. This 
requires clarification of what constitutes ‘an equal weight’ in the first place. In the context of 
a capability-based quality of life index, at least two problems need to be addressed here. 
The first problem is technical and will only be briefly mentioned. When numerical measures 
have been constructed for the scores of each capability-dimension, those measures have to be 
normalised before index-weights can be allocated. But often there are several different 
procedures of normalisation. The choice to select one such procedure from a range of 
alternatives may implicitly entail a choice for a certain weighting of the information based on 
the non-normalised scores on some dimensions, given that it is understood that the 
normalised scores will receive equal weight. For a discussion of this problem in the 
construction of the Commitment to Development Index of the Center for Global 
Development, see Roodman (2006: 5-6). 
The second problem is easier to understand but nevertheless difficult to deal with: should one 
weight each domain equally, or alternatively, should all capability-dimensions receive an 
equal weight, independently of the domain to which they belong? These two options are 
identical only when each domain contains an equal number of dimensions, which is unlikely 
to be the case. One could of course stipulate in advance that this should be the case, but there 
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hardly seem to be good substantive reasons for imposing such a rigid condition. There are 
two theoretical views here. The first of these holds that quality of life is constituted by the 
capability-scores on a set of selected dimensions, each of which captures intrinsically 
valuable aspects, that would be easily recognized by most people as contributing to the 
quality of their lives. In this case, the groupings of dimensions that we call ‘domains’ are 
merely pragmatic tools for demarcating the different areas in which quality of life is assumed 
to be constituted by the selected capabilities. In the reference-index, domains should then 
receive weights in proportion to the number of dimensions they include. 
The second view regards domains rather than dimensions as the primary units of the 
reference-index. One then assumes that overall quality of life is based upon a prior theory 
about people’s options to function in different areas of life, each of which has an independent 
constitutive meaning, whereas making distinctions between different capability-dimensions 
within one and the same domain has a less principled meaning. This approach thus holds that 
the identification of domains in making up a list of capabilities for the quality of life is 
decisive, either for reasons of theory or for policy-related reasons. One will then of course 
want to assign equal weights at the level of domains, not dimensions. It follows that average 
weights of dimensions in more (less) numerous domains will get scaled down (up). 
We have not seen any explicit discussions of this aspect of the weighting problem in the 
literature. Our own method for the selection of capability-domains in 3.1 implicitly started 
from the primacy of the domains, but this was only because it is in line with the available 
literature, which generally focuses on domains. But from 3.1.2 it can be seen that the 
demarcation of domains is not that clear-cut. For example, take physical and mental health. In 
each of these domains one will have to distinguish different dimensions, depending on how 
ambitious the research design is. We suggested that the physical and mental aspects of health 
need to be separated in a policy-relevant index, referring to arguments advanced by Layard to 
the effect that the importance of mental illness is seriously underrated in health policy. 
Alternatively, however, one might decide on theoretical grounds that health should be 
regarded as one single domain, possibly including a lot of different capability-dimensions. In 
the first case, obviously, the dimensions of physical and mental health will receive larger 
weights in the reference-index relative to other capability-dimensions than in the second case. 
In general then, the problem of how to understand ‘equal weights’ poses a challenge to find a 
good balance between the levels of detail of the capabilities that are to be included in the 
index. The condition imposing the number of dimensions per domain is an artificial way to 
guarantee such a balance and therefore not justifiable. Nevertheless, it serves as a reference 
point that a well-balanced index needs to keep in mind. 
 
3.3.4 Reasons for unequal weights: democracy and sustainability 
In the Introduction (1.1) we already mentioned two different viewpoints for allocating 
unequal weights to capability domains. One is to decide ‘democratically’ on the relative 
weights of domains, using information about people’s preferences, while the other tries to 
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determine deviations from equal weights from the point of view of sustainability, for example 
by looking at the environmental pressures caused by upholding a given level of ‘life quality’ 
in each domain. We now discuss these two reasons for deviating from the reference-index, 
assuming throughout that the reference index is based upon a ‘balanced’ way of partitioning 
capability-dimensions into domains. It will be seen that it is by no means easy to work out a 
systematic weighting scheme for capabilities from either of these two normative viewpoints. 
The idea of ‘democratic weighting’ poses the social choice problem of how to aggregate 
information on the relative weights attached by individuals to different capability-domains. 
Such information is hard to come by, and below we shall very briefly discuss a few of the 
issues that have to be faced in empirical research. But supposing that this information is 
available, we think that the most defensible principle from a democratic point of view is not 
to use ‘majority rule’. It is based rather on a more abstract notion of democratic equality: to 
let each adult individual count for one in the determination of relative domain weights, 
assuming the ‘virtual representation’ of children by parents. Chakraborty (1996) argues 
convincingly that the democratic relative weighting factor for a capability should then be 
calculated as the mean of individual weights, and we extend this to capability-domains here. 
The main reason for using such weighting factors rather than the equal weights of the 
reference-index is ‘democratic’ in the following sense: government policy seeking to allocate 
scarce resources among policies designed to promote quality of life in various domains 
should take those weights into account, especially if the variance of the averaged weights is 
small and the averages turn out to differ considerably across domains. 
If democratic weights do indeed strongly deviate from equality, one way of arguing that an 
overall index of life quality be sensitive to such deviations consists in saying that the 
(democratically aggregated) subjective evaluations of how various domains are in fact ranked 
in importance by people must enter into the construction of a capability-index. The 
capability-approach then is forced to accept the idea that subjective evaluations play a part in 
determining the aggregate ‘amount’ of measured life quality for the population a as whole, 
not unlike the utilitarian approach. We do not think that this is a disturbing implication, once 
the averaging principle is accepted. If it is, then the task of constructing an overall index 
based upon democratic weighting will require the design of good survey questions from 
which individual rankings of capability-domains can be derived. It may be wise to start such 
a design by using qualitative findings obtained from deliberative focus group data, in which 
the selection of domains is also discussed beforehand, in line with the methodology outlined 
in section 3.1. 
A related but distinct way of arguing for democratic weighting can be found within the 
resource approach to quality of life, in which subjective evaluations of different resources 
pose a central problem as well. Here the idea is that one should try to ascertain how 
individuals rank resources such as income, wealth holdings, free time and access to public 
amenities of various kinds. For even though such ‘strategic resources’ figure as all-purpose 
means for pursuing an individual plan of life, different life-plans require different bundles of 
such resources, hence subjective evaluations inevitably enter once the aggregation question 
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arises. In 3.3.1 we have seen how capabilities and functionings are related to resource inputs 
(Table 3.3), and we later suggested that when capability-domains compete for the same 
resources, the subjective importance assigned to such competing domains may to some extent 
be revealed by the time and money people want to invest in them, on the optimising choice 
model. This idea can be extended to the public goods that figure in the capability-input 
mapping, by asking people in a survey how much they would be willing to pay (in increased 
tax) for additional units of, say, health care, public transport or education. Evidence of this 
kind provides a different way of assessing individual domain-weightings and can be used 
alongside subjective ranking questions that do not include considerations of willingness to 
forego resources in one capability-domain in order to be able to spend them in another 
domain. 
From these remarks it will be clear that arriving at a trustworthy set of democratic domain-
weights for the purpose of an overall index is quite difficult. Thus there may be pragmatic 
reasons for dispensing with the task. Two such reasons were already mentioned above. Even 
a well-constructed average ‘democratic weight’ of a domain may not represent the 
distribution of individual weights in the population very well, due to large variance, or it 
might not deviate much from the equal weight in the reference index. In these cases it may be 
better to be less ambitious and concentrate on the (already considerable) problems involved 
in constructing proper ‘equal weights’ for the reference-index. Even so, however, there may 
be other reasons not to drop the project of measuring subjective rankings of capabilities. For 
as will be explained in Chapter 4 below, it can be highly useful for policy analyses 
undertaken in the context of the Sustainability Outlook to gather information on the actual 
variety of views among groups in the Dutch population on desired life quality in different 
domains. In that context, the problem of averaging over these views is obviously less 
relevant. It would thus seem possible to use equal domain weights for index purposes, while 
at the same time gathering information on the subjective valuation of capabilities for the 
purposes of identifying group differences. 
Thus for example, the SCP Living Conditions Index uses equal domain weights, even though 
its authors surely are interested in subjective evaluations of separate domains (such as health, 
transport, recreation and housing conditions). The SCP does remark, however, that such 
“…subjective preferences need not coincide with what government deems desirable from the 
point of view of the collective interest” (Roes, 2005: 14). A democratically legitimated 
government in principle has a mandate for determining what policies are in the ‘common 
interest’. But often it will seek guidance for articulating the common interest in widely shared 
normative principles. One salient principle which may recommend deviations from subjective 
weighting factors is the wish to avoid suboptimal social outcomes, when there is evidence 
that collective action problems exist with respect to the underlying allocation of resources. As 
is well-known from happiness research, income-intensive activities may turn out to be 
overvalued compared to time-intensive ones, to the detriment of attainable well-being. 
According to Layard (2005, Ch.4) this is explained by two facts related to interdependencies 
of individual choices: earned income is a positional good, in contrast to free time, and 
increases in income are subject to habituation effects more strongly than free time is. This 
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produces a social dilemma. In seeking to remove the dilemma, government operates on the 
assumption that correcting for the bias in favour of income-intensive activities is conducive 
to overall life quality. In Layard’s utilitarian framework, for example, overall life satisfaction 
could be increased by optimally taxing income from work, in such a way that people are 
induced to substitute income for free time. In the capability approach, it is less easy to 
determine the optimal intervention, but the same social dilemma would have to be addressed 
in a similar, though more indirect way. This means that government policy will then not 
endorse subjective weighting factors, to the extent that these weights are derived from 
individual preferences in favour of relatively income-intensive capabilities and against time-
intensive ones. 
Similar indirect reasons for deviating from democratic - or even from equal - weights are 
given by constraints of sustainability. Such constraints are always linked to the availability of 
resources, and thus indirectly to capabilities, by way of the capability-input mapping. Thus if 
it is easier to satisfy the moral demands of sustainability (discussed in 1.3) by promoting 
time-intensive capabilities in the society rather than capabilities which require high inputs of 
income and expensive public outlays, then in principle this creates a basis for a ‘socially 
optimal’ weighting of capability-domains by the government (and of capability-dimensions 
within domains) on the normative grounds of sustainability. In the next chapter we will see 
that the knowledge and information problems of such a weighting scheme are daunting, and 
may held to be insurmountable as a basis for policies of sustainable development. Working 
out a generally authoritative scheme of this kind could thus be ruled out in practice, due to the 
uncertainties and the controversial nature of some of the assumptions underlying the 
construction of ‘sustainability weights’. 
In conclusion, the issue of weighting the capabilities in different domains of social life 
involves two stages: the construction of a balanced scheme of equal weights, and working out 
reasoned departures from this standard of reference from different normative points of view 
on such as democratic equality, avoiding suboptimalities due to interdependencies, and 
respecting constraints of sustainability. In theory this looks fine enough, but as our discussion 
indicates, any serious attempt to carry out this second stage requires a lot of empirical work 
which will inevitably be based upon contestable theoretical assumptions. In order to assess 
whether this work should be undertaken in a research project of constructing an overall index 
of life quality, it would be prudent to carefully investigate in advance to what extent the 
equally-weighted reference index is sensitive to changes in domain-weights, for a given 
dataset. This can be done by correlating the reference-index with several indices constructed 
from unequal weights (see Roodman, 2006: 8-9 for a discussion of this exploration 
procedure). 
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4 Dealing with plurality in sustainability policies 
 
4.1 Charting plurality: the method of action perspectives 
 
An important starting point of the methodology used in the Sustainability Outlook is that it is 
wise not to try and answer the large question ‘how well the Netherlands is doing with respect 
to sustainability’ on the basis of a uniform set of norms and principles which are assumed to 
be binding for society as a whole, and on a purely scientific analysis of the restrictions on 
resources that such norms and principles would place on the pursuit of well-being. The 
Sustainability Outlook rather favours a bottom-up approach, by starting to asking what people 
actually think about these issues. It therefore focuses on the various ways in which the 
existing plurality of moral values and empirical beliefs among different groups in the Dutch 
population works its way into the diversity of their views on both sustainability and life 
quality. In short, the idea behind this research effort of MNP is that one can identify different 
world views which are shared by sections of the public, each of which has its own 
implications for trends in sustainable development, and each of which also poses its own 
risks in case the world view in question would become politically dominant. Policy advice 
based on a scenario analysis of these trends is held to be useful. In this section we want to 
comment on the policy logic of the MNP research programme. In the next and final section 
we offer tentative suggestions for developing the world view method of charting plurality 
with respect to issues of sustainability and life quality within the framework of the capability 
approach set out in the previous chapters. 
We start out by examining the logic behind the emphasis on plurality by discussing a 
pathbreaking report of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), 
originally published in 1994 and entitled Sustained Risks: A Lasting Phenomenon (WRR, 
1995). This report expresses fundamental doubts about the feasibility of translating normative 
demands of sustainability - for example safeguarding a certain level of need-satisfaction for 
the coming generation - into objective ecological and economic requirements, which should 
then be taken as the basis for polices of sustainable development. The Council especially 
questions the ruling approach adopted by the Dutch environmental policy plans, according to 
which the administrative and instrumental aspects of environmental policy can be 
straightforwardly based upon a scientifically ascertainable carrying capacity of the 
environment, a carrying capacity which is to be preserved for the future in the interest of 
sustainable development. To achieve this goal, environmental policy should formulate 
general constraints, from which quantitative behavioural targets are then derived for a range 
of actors in different policy sectors. It is indeed true that the architecture of Dutch 
environmental policy plans is based on this general idea, and even has included the Dutch 
consumers among the actors which should obey environmental targets, by approaching 
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consumers in their role as responsible citizens through a range of social policy instruments 
including information campaigns and moral persuasion (see Pellikaan and Van der Veen, 
2002, Ch, 2). 
However, the Council’s report is driven by criticism of this grand and centralistic policy 
scheme. The authors are convinced that the state of knowledge of environmental 
developments, and of the impact of human actions on these, is radically inadequate for 
objectively determining an environmental ‘carrying capacity’ of the society, and deriving 
from it a set of necessary behavioural changes for sustainable development. (WRR, 1995: 
18). More fundamentally, the Council notes that the knowledge which would required for 
operating the policy sequence “carrying capacity/constraints/behaviour” is not merely 
insufficiently available, but also that the knowledge actually at hand is riddled with untested 
factual assumptions and normative presuppositions, for example concerning the extent of 
future technological change and the acceptability of risk-estimates of environmental harms. 
In addition, quite different views exist on the feasibility of obtaining behavioural changes in 
society for sustainable development, as well as different opinions about the social costs of 
such changes. All these views and opinions are clearly contestable, and they are often hidden 
away in the scientific analysis of environmental problems used by policy-makers. 
Thus according to the Council, it must be conceded that policy knowledge for sustainable 
development is not only uncertain, but that its very status is socially contested, because this 
kind of knowledge is inextricably bound together with diverging values and conceptual 
constructions which can at most command an intersubjective basis of assent between groups, 
but cannot be claimed to be objectively valid. However, the Council goes on to note that both 
in scientific circles and policy communities, as well as in society at large, it is possible to 
discern systematically different patterns of values and beliefs, each of which represents a 
distinct ‘action perspective’ on sustainable development, and on the need for behavioural 
adjustments to be brought about by policy efforts.  
The report actually follows up this basic methodology of policy analysis by presenting four 
stylised action perspectives, each of which represents distinct responses to the problem of 
tying economic activity to environmental desiderata. On the side of production, two options 
are distinguished: p1 ‘adaptation of production methods’ versus p2 ‘change in the nature of 
production methods’, whereas on the side of consumption, the two options refer to 
preferences for a ‘high’ (c1) or ‘low’ (c2) level of consumption. This produces a two-by-two 
scheme of action perspectives respectively labelled Utilizing (p1c1), Managing (p2c1), 
Saving (p1c2) and Preserving (p2c2) (WRR, 1995: 44, Table 2.1).  
Each of these perspectives is regarded as the result of a more or less tightly reasoned and 
empirically supported narrative with its own implications for policy. The method of policy 
analysis consists in juxtaposing different action perspectives and comparing their 
implications over time with the aid of scenario techniques, both for government policy as a 
whole, and separately for important policy sectors such as energy, water management and 
world food supply. It is expected that this novel method will both generate systematic and 
reciprocal learning effects across adherents of different perspectives, and will also enable the 
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identification of common policy options, which are based upon more inclusive factual 
information. Compared to traditional methods, the recommendations issuing from this kind of 
policy analysis will be conditional on action perspectives rather than authoritative of what the 
‘scientific community’ thinks, but the Council does not regard this to be a disadvantage, for 
the principled reasons discussed above. 
In this new approach to policies of sustainability, then, plurality of values and beliefs in 
society assumes a central place. In the more recent research efforts of MNP within the 
programme of the Sustainability Outlook, this is the case as well, and even more markedly so, 
as can be explained by noting three differences with respect to the Council’s 1994 report. 
First of all, the MNP’s exploration of trends in the scenario format is based upon a more 
broadly conceived notion of sustainable development, which does not limit itself to 
confronting economic production and consumption with environmental necessities, but rather 
seeks to bring the wider set of sustainability concerns discussed in Chapter 1 to bear upon the 
goal of ‘maintaining the quality of life’. In contrast to the Council’s purely conceptual 
scheme, secondly, the MNP attempts to distinguish different action perspectives on the basis 
of empirical research. Thirdly and finally, the construction of these action perspectives on 
sustainable development is elaborated in two consecutive empirical stages as follows.  
First, existing plurality among the Dutch population, as conceptualised within two related 
typologies of value orientations and world views, has been examined in several rounds of 
public opinion surveys, from which the world view typology emerges as the most salient one. 
The scheme underlying that typology consists in grouping different clusters of value and 
belief attitudes along two conceptual axes. The horizontal axis captures orientations of 
respondents on a ‘distributive’ dimension representing the opposition between solidarity and 
economic efficiency, whereas the vertical axis collects scores on a dimension representing the 
extent of ‘international interlinkages’, ranging from a regional (local or national) orientation 
to a global orientation on the world as a whole. Combination of the two axes generates a 
fourfold typology of action perspectives - the world views - which are respectively called 
Global Market, Global Solidarity, Safe Region and Caring Region. The empirical validation 
of this survey instrument is the first stage of the MNP method.  
The second stage is to derive more specific action perspectives on sustainability, in 
connection with views on desired life quality. This is done with the aid of another survey 
instrument, which is made up of questions concerning the relative importance people attach 
to a large number of social problems on an inventory list. That list covers environmental 
problems, for example the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, energy utilisation and depletion 
of national resources, which easily fit into the Council’s more traditional four-way typology 
discussed above. But the inventory is far more inclusive, for it also deals with economic 
issues such as pensions, government debt, unemployment and the tax burden, cultural 
problems such as influx of foreign immigrants, as well as questions relating to the large 
global issues of poverty, hunger and human rights. Respondents are asked to rank the items 
on the inventory list in order of urgency, where the more ‘urgent’ social problems are defined 
as the ones judged to be of more pressing concern now and in the future. 
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This second survey instrument exemplifies the interdependency view on the relationship 
between life quality and sustainability that we discussed in section 1.4 under the catch phrase 
of sustainability in life quality. For in its report reflecting on the methodological background 
of the Sustainability Outlook, the MNP notes that in these measurements, ‘quality of life’ is 
implicitly being approached as the extent to which people think that there is progress in 
dealing with the social problems that they deem most important (MNP, 2006: 24). But at the 
same time, the rankings of those social problems also implicitly reflect the particular views of 
persons on sustainable development, both at home and elsewhere. We return to this point in 
the next section.  
To round off our brief exposition of the MNP method, the two stages of empirical inquiry 
into the plurality of values and beliefs are finally connected, by statistically correlating 
respondent rankings of social problems with scores on the two dimensions of the world view 
typology. Thus systematic differences between ranking patterns of respondents are explained 
by the particular world views they turn out to hold (see the table in Sustainability Outlook, 
MNP-RIVM, 2005: 12).  
To sum up, following the lead of the 1994 report by the Netherlands Scientific Council on 
Government Policy, the MNP has developed a distinct and sophisticated way of charting the 
plurality of views on sustainability issues among the Dutch population, with the aim of 
bringing this information to bear on policy analysis which is informed by scenario methods. 
4.2 Sustainable life quality and world views: an alternative 
suggestion 
 
As will be recalled from section 1.4, we argued for the position that it is advisable to regard 
sustainability as a set of objectives and constraints on the pursuit of life quality in a national 
society, but not to incorporate demands of sustainability in the metric of life quality itself. 
After the concept of life quality was elaborated more concretely in terms of the capability 
approach in chapters 2 and 3, this position implies a more specific understanding of the 
notion of sustainable life quality, for it then follows that that various demands of 
sustainability set normative conditions on the extent to which a national government can 
attempt to advance the capabilities of its citizens to function in several domains of social life.  
In itself, this position is compatible with the basic idea of policy analysis discussed in the last 
section, according to which it is necessary to gain an empirical understanding of the plurality 
of values and beliefs which forms the background for a diversity of specific views regarding 
life quality and sustainability. It is also compatible with the first stage of the research design 
underlying the Sustainability Outlook, which captures this plurality by means of the stylised 
action perspectives exemplified by the world view typology. But at the same time, our 
position to keep sustainability outside of the metric of life quality is at variance with the 
second stage of the MNP research design, which attempts to capture different views among 
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the population regarding the relative importance of both domestic and global ‘social 
problems’ on an inventory list. For in that survey instrument, as we have seen, the concepts 
of quality of life and sustainability are implicitly bound together in a way that does not allow 
them to be clearly distinguished.  
For example, a respondent who ranks domestic unemployment at the top of the inventory list, 
above human rights and global poverty, might indirectly be expressing a view on the good 
life as well as a view on competing claims of justice. The first view could be interpreted to 
hold that a good quality of life in the Netherlands depends on (or may even be constituted by) 
regular access to paid work, while the second view could be construed as saying that this 
element of quality should be properly secured for the present generation at home, before 
policy efforts are undertaken to secure human rights (even to economic opportunities) and 
adequate nourishment of people elsewhere in the world, either currently or in the more distant 
future.19 To what extent these two views are held separately, however, is difficult to tell. And 
to what extent the second view would be motivated by empirical beliefs regarding the 
possibilities of securing access to work through international transfers or market mechanisms 
is also hard to tell. In the method of the Sustainability Outlook, in any case, such a ranking 
answer must be interpreted as one holistic response to the general issue of sustainability in 
life quality. But this is perhaps less informative for purposes of policy analysis than a method 
which separates judgements on life quality from judgements concerning international and 
intergenerational norms of distribution more clearly. 
The question we now wish to address is whether it is possible to reshape the second stage of 
the research design of the Sustainability Outlook along such lines. We can only offer some 
suggestions here. In short, the proposal would be to design three distinct sets of questions.  
Starting first with life quality, respondents are asked to identify the capability-domains of 
social life which they regard most important, and the extent to which they can command the 
connected resource inputs for realizing these capabilities. Secondly, responses to desiderata 
of sustainability are to be gathered, in which respondents are asked to choose from among 
normative menus containing alternative views on domestic, international and 
intergenerational sustainability issues. And thirdly, the same respondents are to be questioned 
about their views on the possible consequences of their chosen positions on the various issues 
of sustainability for pursuing the elements of life quality they favour in Dutch society, 
including some specific questions about the type of government policies they would hold to 
be desirable and viable. 
 If these three sets of questions are designed carefully, then it must be possible to detect 
systematic patterns in the overall responses, which may be compared to the scores of these 
respondents on the dimensions of the world view typology. The exciting question will be 
                                                 
19 As can be seen from the Table on p. 12 of the English summary of the Sustainability Outlook, this particular response to ranking 
social problems is predicted by respondents’ positions on the efficiency side of the horizontal axis, irrespective of their position on 
the axis of international interlinkages. For the table shows that unemployment gets significantly ranked at the top of the inventory 
list in the Global Market and Safe Region world views, but not in the Global Solidartity and Caring Region world views. 
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whether scores on world views are good predictors of these systematic patterns. If so, then 
this would show that the action perspectives captured by the world view typology are useful 
for summarizing a wealth of specific information on diverging views with respect to both 
desired life quality and sustainability, separately conceived. This could form an alternative 
basis for extracting conditional policy recommendations from scenario extrapolations of the 
world views, and be of use in searching for risk-minimizing policy programs that combine 
common elements across different scenarios, in the general way envisaged by the 
Sustainability Outlook. 
To illustrate the possible value of this alternative suggestion briefly, we sketch some points of 
departure for designing each of the three sets of questions, and connecting the responses with 
the world view data. For the modelling of questions concerning views on the quality of life, it 
is important to keep in mind that the capability approach recognizes variety among 
individuals with respect to the subjective valuation of capabilities, both across domains and 
within given domains. Earlier, we examined the possibility of attaching ‘democratic’ domain-
weights for the purpose of constructing a summary index measure of life quality in 3.2.3. We 
there mentioned two different ways of measuring subjective valuations, one of which is 
simply to let respondents rank domains in order of importance, while the other is to ask to 
what extent they are willing to invest the resources of time and money in different (strongly 
competing) domains. In this more indirect ‘revealed preference’ method, it is also useful to 
have information on people’s willingness to pay for the crucial inputs of public provision that 
support capabilities in different domains, as shown by a capability input-mapping. 
For the design of questions aiming to catch variety in normative desiderata of sustainability, 
we once again refer to the typology of requirements contained in our national definition of 
sustainability and set out in the four rubrics in the cells of Table 2.1. We claimed that it is 
extremely important not to lose sight of the fact that sustainability - in the sense of viably 
maintaining a good quality of life for the present generation within national boundaries - is an 
overarching goal for the government, which should be clearly distinguished from the 
international and intergenerational constraints that refer to the interests of people elsewhere 
and/or later. In 1.3, additionally, we suggested that a policy-relevant elaboration of 
sustainability requirements would profit from a systematic overview of the actual 
commitments undertaken by successive governments to promote sustainability objectives, 
because such commitments can in principle be regarded as being democratically legitimated. 
This is also of relevance here, for it is obviously useful for policy purposes to use the items in 
such an overview as a basis of comparison for in measuring normative differences in opinion 
among the population, rather than asking people to respond to more vaguely worded choices 
between the economy and the environment, or between the well-being of our own children 
thirty years later and the fate of children in poor countries at this moment. It is also good to 
be aware of the fact that in order to respond to actual sustainability commitments in force 
within their society, people first need to be informed about what these commitments are, in 
fact.  
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The third set of questions on beliefs concerning the consequences of sustainability objectives 
for life quality should also be reasonably concrete. It may be a good idea to take the lead 
from the action perspectives proposed in Sustained Risks: a Lasting Phenomenon which we 
discussed above. For one may assume, as a starting point at least, that what is required by 
sustainable development at home and abroad will largely be perceived by the public as 
bearing on long-run policy choices with respect to production methods and consumption 
levels.  
From this short sketch, finally, one can derive a methodological point concerning the 
connection between patterns of responses on life quality and sustainability on the one hand 
and patterns of responses on world views on the other. If the typology of world views (and 
the typology of value orientations that is related to it) is to serve as a good basis for policy 
analysis in the format of scenario studies of different sectors, as described by the 
Sustainability Outlook, then that typology should actually prove its usefulness by its ability to 
predict significant differences among the population with respect to relevant aspects of life 
quality and relevant convictions and beliefs about sustainability. In this section, we have tried 
to outline how to set up a survey for researching these two basic concerns among the 
population in conformity with the position that life quality and sustainability are conceptually 
distinct. In the design of proper survey questions, however, the aim of collating the responses 
with scores on world views also requires that care is taken not to frame these new questions 
in ways that ensure a statistical association in advance.  
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